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Authority and Autonomy: The State, the
Individual and the Familyt
M. DAVID GELFAND*
This commentary focuses primarily upon the views ex-
pressed by Justice Rehnquist in his de Hirsch Meyer lecture. The
author argues that a corollary to Justice Rehnquist's view that
the judiciary should defer to the authority of private institutions
over the individual, to protect those institutions, would be to
adopt a judicial attitude of supporting private institutions
against legislative interference. An examination of Justice
Rehnquist's judicial opinions in the area of constitutional family
law reveals exactly the opposite position. The author concludes
that Justice Rehnquist's position of judicial deference to legisla-
tive decisions over the family may lead to destruction of the
institution rather than to preservation of the family and suggests
ways of accommodating the interests of individual family mem-
bers, the interest of the family as an institution and the legiti-
mate police power and parens patriae regulations of the state.
1. IN TRODU CTION . ............................................... . 126
II. PHILOSOPHICAL BACKGROUND - CONFLICTS AMONG THE
INDIVIDUAL, INSTITUTIONS AND THE STATE ......................... 127
A. Justice Rehnquist and the Authority Model ................... 127
B. The Libertarian M odel .................. .................... 130
III. FROM PHILOSOPHY TO LEGAL DOCTRINE - INDIVIDUAL INTERESTS
AND STATE INTERESTS ............................................ 132
A. Individual Liberty in Constitutional Terms . 132
B . S ta te P ow ers ............... a ......... ..................... . 136
C . P olice P ow er ................................................ 136
1. ENFORCEMENT OF MORALITY - CRIMINAL IMPLICATIONS ........ 138
2. ENFORCEMENT OF MORALITY - CIVIL IMPLICATIONS ............. 142
D . P arens P atriae .............................................. 144
1. TRADITIONAL PARENS PATRIAE .................................. 144
2. THE FAMILY AND PARENS PATRIAE .............................. 148
3. INDIVIDUAL OPPOSITION TO PARENS PATRIAE POWER ............. 150
E. Legal Paternalism - State Restrictions to Protect
Sane Adults from Themselves ..................... 151
IV. STATE INTRUSIONS THAT DEFINE THE FAMILY RELATIONSHIP ........... 157
V. POLICE POWER REGULATION OF ADULT SEXUAL CONDUCT ............... 161
A. Regulation of Deviate Sexual Practices of Married Couples ........ 161
t The author reserves all reprint and photocopying rights.
* Assistant Professor Tulane Law School. J.D., Columbia, 1976; B.Phil., Oxford, 1974;
B.A., Columbia, 1971. The author was an Instructor in Law at the University of Miami School
of Law when the Third Annual Baron deHirsch Meyer Lectures were given. He would like to
thank Gil Singer and Maxine Long for their research assistance, Joel Stillman for his research
and comments, Professor Greenwalt at Columbia for his continuing encouragement, and
colleagues at both Miami and Tulane for their criticisms and suggestions.
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
B. Abortion Consent Requirements .............................. 162
VI. STATE REGULATION OF MINORS ............... ....... . .. . . 163
A. Regulation of Sexual Activities of Minors .............. ...... 164
B. Choice of Medical Treatment by Children or Parents .......... 166
C. Civil Com m itm ent .................................. ....... 170
V II. C ON CLU SION ................................................... 171
I. INTRODUcTION
This commentary will concentrate primarily upon Justice
Rehnquist's view, as articulated in his de Hirsch Meyer lecture' and
in several judicial opinions, that the judiciary should defer to the
authority of government and private institutions over the putative
rights of individuals living under the rule of that government and
those institutions. It will be argued that this pro-authority, judicial-
abdication approach has two basic flaws: (1) categorical judicial
deference to institutional decisions prevents the full development of
personal identity essential to exercising fundamental personal liber-
ties; and (2) categorical judicial deference toward legislative inter-
ference with private institutions may undermine the ability of these
institutions to mediate between atomized individuals and the state.
An alternative normative model that gives prominence to the indi-
vidual and the individual's interactions within primary groups will
be proposed and evaluated. The implications of this modified liber-
tarian analysis will be contrasted with Justice Rehnquist's pro-
authority stance, first at the level of legal doctrine and then at the
level of individual cases in the constitutional family law area. The
family is chosen as the focus primarily because two of the de Hirsch
Meyer lecturers (and the author) recognize its continuing validity
as the basic form of group association in our society. 2 Moreover,
recent cases in this field provide fertile ground for comparing Justice
Rehnquist's categorical deference analysis of state-family-
individual conflicts both with the more activist approach advocated
by Professor Tribe3 and with the intermediate approach taken by an
emerging majority of the Burger Court.
1. Rehnquist, The Adversary Society: Keynote Address of the Third Annual Baron de
Hirsch Meyer Lecture Series, 33 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1 (1978).
2. Id. at 8, 9; Tribe, Forward: Toward a Model of Roles in the Due Process of Life and
Law, 87 HARv. L. Rxv. 1, 34-35 (1973).
3. Tribe, Seven Pluralist Fallacies: In Defense of the Adversary Process-A Reply to
Justice Rehnquist, 33 U. MIAMI L. REV. 43 (1978). Professor Tribe's lecture described and
refuted seven pluralist fallacies which "have induced exaggerated fears of adjudication and
an understated appreciation of what it can contribute to the legitimacy of our system of
government." Id. at 44. His views are further elaborated in L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrru-
TIONAL LAW (1978).
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II. PHILOSOPHICAL BACKGROUND-CONFLICTS AMONG THE INDIVIDUAL,
INSTITUTIONS AND THE STATE
A. Justice Rehnquist and the Authority Model
Justice Rehnquist began his de Hirsch Meyer lecture in what
he called "a purely jurisprudential way,"' and chose Edmund
Burke5 and Edward Carr' as his intellectual forefathers. He closed
his lecture with an extensive quotation from Burke's attack upon
the contractarian view of political obligation.' Drawing upon this
philosophical background and some case law, he asked (and an-
swered) only one of the difficult questions raised by the complex
relations among the state, private institutions and individuals:
What should the judicial response be when putative individual
rights come into conflict with institutional decisions and interests?
He stated that his "hypothesis is not that an individual's claim for
redress of wrong would be better vindicated in a nonadversarial
system, but that in some situations it is best not vindicated at all" 8
because crystallizing the differences among institutional members
into adversary positions "may. threaten the ftiture of the
[continuing] institutional relationship."' This, he argued, is par-
ticularly true with respect to intrafamily disputes. s0
Standing alone, this argument is an incomplete statement of
Justice Rehnquist's views on the proper societal role of the family
and the courts. These views can be flushed out only by posing a
second question: What should the judicial response be when family
decisions and interests come into conflict with legislative
determinations? On the basis of his de Hirsch Meyer lecture, one
4. Rehnquist, supra note 1, at 2.
5. Id. at 19. For a commentary on Burke's views on the relationship between the state
and the individual, see Parkin, Burke and the Conservative Tradition, in POLITICAL IDEAS 118
(D. Thompson ed. 1972).
6. Rehnquist, supra note 1, at 7.
7. Id. at 19 (quoting E. BURKE, RELECONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 93-94 (E.
Rhys. ed. 1910)). A recent resuscitation of contractarian philosophy that has received sub-
stantial attention in legal and philosophical circles is J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1973).
For interesting critiques, see B. BARRY, THE LIBERAL THEORY OF JUSTICE (1973); MacCormack,
Justice According to Rawls, 89 LAW Q. REv. 393 (1973); Merritt, Justice As Fairness: A
Commentary on Rawls' New Theory of Justice, 26 VAND L. REv. 665 (1973); Comment, John
Rawls'-a Theory of Justice, 40 U. CIN. L. REv. 486 (1973).
8. Rehnquist, supra note 1, at 10.
9. Id. at 14. His reason for deferring to certain private institutional decisions appears
to be based upon a calculus of social utility. While allowing adversarial conflict by institu-
tional members might ensure "a 'better' decision in some objective sense, [it] can only
disrupt ongoing relationships within the institution and thereby hamper the ability of the
institution to serve its designated societal function." Id. at 2.
10. Id. at 12-13.
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might have predicted that a corollary of Justice Rehnquist's opposi-
tion to judicial intervention into internal family affairs would be
opposition to legislative intrusions into these affairs. Yet, a brief
survey of his recent opinions in the family law area" reveals that he
has consistently answered this second question by upholding the
legislature, rather than the family, as the favored decisionmaker. In
an earlier article 12 and in numerous judicial opinions, 3 Justice
Rehnquist attempts to justify this position on the basis of the judici-
ary's alleged lack of legitimacy and competence to overturn value
choices made by legislatures in a pluralistic society. A general refu-
tation of this reasoning has been provided by Professor Tribe, who
characterizes it as the fallacy of "undue modesty. " 4 The other com-
mentators in this issue argue as well that the legitimacy of active
constitutional judicial review in defense of individual rights against
legislative majorities is a well-established historical reality.15 I
would add that the specific goal articulated by Justice Rehnquist
of preserving ongoing family relationships demands more than the
judicial deference to family decisions he advocates. Rather, active
judicial protection of the family as an institution is necessary. If
family relationships are too delicate and too important to be dis-
turbed by adversary courtroom conflict," then surely they are too
delicate and important to be impinged upon by intrusive legislative
regulation. Thus, if family integrity means anything, it means that
there are some substantive limits upon the regulatory power, not
only of the courts, but of the state generally in its ability to define
the composition, scope or content of family relationships.
This is by no means a novel position. It falls within a deep-
rooted judicial tradition of protecting family interests against ma-
joritarian regulations, traceable directly to Meyer v. Nebraska7 and
Pierce v. Society of Sisters. '8 These decisions, despite their reliance
upon a substantive due process and natural law rationale, have been
11. See notes 192-208 infra.
12. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEx. L. Rav. 693 (1976).
13. See, e.g., Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 717 (1977) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 777 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 171 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.,
406 U.S. 164, 177 (1972) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
14. Tribe, supra note 3, at 52.
15. See Casebeer, The Judging Glass, 33 U. MiAh L. Rav. 59 (1978); Wisotaky, Beyond
Legitimacy, 33 U. MIAm L. Rav. 173 (1978).
16. Rehnquist, supra note 1, at 12-13.
17. 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (invalidating a statute that prohibited teaching foreign languages
to school children which the state claimed was justified by its interest in promoting patriot-
ism).
18. 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (invalidating a requirement that all parents send their children
to public schools).
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repeatedly reaffirmed by the Supreme Court." The new develop-
ment is the Burger Court's gradual recognition that both courts and
legislatures must employ policy (or principle)" analysis that ade-
quately accounts for the impact of legislative and executive actions
upon the complicated interrelations among children, parents and
the state.2' The "role allocation" 2 issue, therefore, is not simply
whether the court or the legislature should make a particular deci-
sion, but whether the individual or the state should make it. Indeed,
where family legal problems are involved, the question becomes
which individual should decide: husband, wife, parent, child or
some combination of these individuals with guidance and direction
by the state. Categorical deference to the legislature or the family
is an inadequate substitute for this kind of complex analysis.
Justice Rehnquist's answers to these questions reflect his pref-
erence for the consensus-building operations of institutions exercis-
ing authority, as opposed to the conflict-ridden assertion of individ-
ual rights in the adversary atmosphere of the courtroom. More sim-
ply, he favors virtual judicial impotence in the face of legislative and
family initiatives. He is prepared to accept the substitution of au-
thority figures such as union leaders, church officials or family
heads for state authority, but when the legislature lifts the delega-
tion of authority, this decision must be respected by the courts.
Thus, like Burke, Justice Rehnquist views anarchy as the only alter-
19. See, e.g., Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 684-85 (1977); Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213 (1972); Stanley v. Illinois,
405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972).
20. Ronald Dworkin, who succeeded H.L.A. Hart as the Oxford Professor of Jurisprud-
ence, makes the distinction between arguments of "principle" which "justify a political
decision by showing that the decision respects or secures some individual or group right,"
Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARv. L. REv. 1057, 1059 (1975), and arguments of "policy" which
"justify a political decision by showing that the decision advances or protects some collective
[economic, political or social] goal of the community as a whole." Id. It is part of his attack
upon the inadequacy of Professor Hart's definition of law as a "system of rules." See H.L.A.
HART, CONCEr OF LAW (1961). Dworkin goes on to argue that legislatures can rely upon both
principle and policy arguments, but court decisions are, and should be, generated solely by
arguments of principle. Dworkin, supra, at 1059-61. See also R. DwoRKIN, TAKING RIGHTS
SERIOUSLY (1977).
Professor Kent Greenawalt has argued that courts characteristically do, and should, rely
upon principle and policy arguments to justify their decisions in hard cases. Greenawalt,
Policy, Rights, and Judicial Decision, 11 GA. L. Rzv. 991 (1977). See also, Greenawalt,
Discretion and Judicial Decision: The Elusive Quest for the Fetters that Bind Judges, 75
COLUM. L. REv. 359 (1975) (attacking Dworkin's theory. of judicial discretion). Dworkin re-
sponds that many of the examples of judicial policymaking which Greenawalt has isolated
really rest upon "consequentialist" arguments of principle. Dworkin, Seven Critics, 11 GA.
L. REv. 1201, 1203-23 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Dworkin Response].
21. See notes 183-277 and accompanying text infra.
22. Tribe, supra note 2, at 10-15.
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native to authority 3 and does not permit the interrelaton'of semi-
autonomous institutions and individuals.
B. The Libertarian Model
In order to appreciate the full theoretical and practical implica-
tions of Justice Rehnquist's pro-authority construct, an alternative
analytical model premised at least partly upon the radical individu-
alism advocated by John Stuart Mill and by his modern libertarian
followers must be examined. More than a century ago, Mill articu-
lated "one very simple principle" to regulate the relations between
the individual and society:
[T]he sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually
or collectively in interfering with the liberty of action of any of
their number, is self protection . . . . [T]he only purpose for
which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a
civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to oth-
ers. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient
warrant."
Just as Justice Rehnquist recognized the limitations of Burke's phi-
losophy when applied to contemporary American society,2 one must
also acknowledge the shortcomings of Mill's principle.26 Yet, despite
23. Rehnquist, supra note 1, at 18-20.
24. Mill, On Liberty, in EssEwTLL WORKS OF JOHN STUART MiLL 263 (M. Lerner ed. 1965).
Mill then distinguished two spheres of human conduct. The first involves "such actions as
are prejudicial to the interests of others." Id. at 340. For this conduct, "the individual is
accountable and may be subjected either to social or to legal punishments." Id. The second
sphere involves "self-regarding" conduct, which may not be regulated by society. In this
sphere, the individual's "independence is, of right, absolute. Over himself, over his own body
and mind, the individual is sovereign." Id. at 263.
25. Rehnquist, supra note 1, at 18-19.
26. Professor Tribe argues that Mill's "self-regarding" category, as well as the definitions
of "privacy" attempted by contemporary authors, see notes 35-36 infra, are underinclusive
for two reasons. First, they focus upon the "inward-looking face of privacy," thereby exclud-
ing "outward-looking aspects of self that are expressed less through demanding secrecy,
sanctuary, or seclusion than through seeking to project one identity rather than another upon
the public world." L. TRiBE, supra note 3, at 887-88. He argues that an adequate conception
of selfhood must include the freedom to have an impact upon others through projecting a
public identity, and therefore the right of personhood should include the "affirmative duties
of government" as well as "its obligations to refrain from certain forms of control." He admits,
however, that too broad a definition of privacy runs the risk of becoming a meaningless
concept, and that his approach to the social and solitary aspects of personhood must draw
upon a variety of claimed and established rights. Id. at 888-89. The right of personhood does
prove to be a useful conceptualization for organizing chapters of his constitutional treatise,
but it may have less utility as a basis for asserting or establishing a constitutional right of
privacy in a particular case.
Professor Tribe's second attack upon Mill's "self-regarding" category is that "virtually
any action has non-trivial consequences beyond any perimeter defined in advance." Id. at
888. Thus, because of the interdependence of modern society, the third-party harms approach
[Vol. 33:125
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its limitations, many modern libertarians believe that Mill's princi-
ple (as expounded and clarified in his Essay on Liberty) "at least
offers the outlines of a coherent limitation upon government's abil-
ity to intervene in the private conduct of its citizens"" and may
even provide "a reasonable frame of reference for evaluating the
constitutional validity of criminal laws."28 The principal advantage
of this analysis is that it begins from the individual as the basic unit
of society and builds upward, basing the justification for interfer-
ence with personal liberty upon third-party harms rather than upon
aggregative social benefits. It thus serves as a useful starting point
for this commentary.
The libertarian analysis will answer differently the first ques-
tion raised above, which pits individual interests against institu-
tional interests. The notion is that governmental abridgement of
freedom must be justified by some permissible governmental goal,
(see notes 27-29 and accompanying text infra) is seen as an inadequate basis for analysis.
Yet, Tribe admits that his own analysis must be restricted to the relationship between
government and the individual (based upon "little beyond a profession of faith"), thus
excluding much of the social interrelations of private life. Id. at 890.
While this author has slightly more faith in the utility of third-party harms analysis than
does Professor Tribe, the treatment of police power, parens patriae and legal paternalism
contained herein is not inconsistent with Tribe's attempt to make a substantive judgment as
to the "illegitimate or insufficient" purposes of government based upon "the nature of the
right being asserted and the way in which it is brought into play." Id. at 891.
Other contemporary philosophers and legal theorists, while subscribing to much of Mill's
critical philosophy, believe that he stated his "one very simple principle" in terms that are
both unnecessarily absolute and overly general. They restate Mill's "absolute right" to liberty
as a strong (but rebuttable) presumption in favor of freedom of action and apply his abstract
and formal defense of liberty to specific instances of state interference with self-regarding
actions. S. BENN & R. PrrSt, SOCIAL PRINCPLES AND THE DEMOCRATC STATE 221 (1959);
Dworkin, Paternalism, in MORALITY AND THE LAW 107 (Wasserstrom ed. 1971).
A 1970 survey of American court opinions dealing with statutory regulation of personal
conduct found very few that specifically mentioned Mill, either with approval or disapproval.
37 U. CHI. L. Rav. 605 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Judicial Reaction]. The author suggested
three possible explanations:
Mill's influence . . . probably had an impact on the legislative process, thus
effectively screening out those measures most obnoxious to Mill's principle and
to the legislators' concern with individual freedom. A second explanation lies in
the decline of substantive due process and the consequent narrowing of judicial
willingness to limit the state's exercise of the police power . . . . Thirdly, since
there is no specific constitutional provision embodying Mill's principle. . . courts
may be reticent to strike down such legislation in the absence of a more explicit
constitutional mandate.
Id. at 606 (footnotes omitted).
27. Lister, The Right to Control the Use of One's Body, in THlE RIGHTS OF AMmucANs 348,
355 (N. Dorsen ed. 1972).
28. Hindes, Morality Enforcement Through the Criminal Law and the Modern Doctrine
of Substantive Due Process, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 344, 377 n.143 (1977). Sartorius also contends
that Mill was "arguing on something like the Constitutional level." Sartorius, The Enforce-
ment of Morality, 81 YALE L.J. 891, 902 (1972).
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and this analysis argues that appropriate goals can be discerned on
the basis of third-party effects. In addition, the libertarian model
at least suggests a different approach to the second question of
institutional decisions versus state decisions. The reason is that the
libertarian values primary institutions because they further individ-
ual interests and train their members in the exercise of democratic
rights, while the supporter of the authority model values institu-
tions because they are socially useful and teach their members to
respect authority."9 Nevertheless, although the libertarian model
can serve as a touchstone and basis for a critique of the implications
of the authority model, it too has its limitations in suggesting the
proper judicial resolution of certain conflicts between individual
members of a family.
III. FROM PHILOSOPHY TO LEGAL DOCTRINE-INDIVIDUAL
INTERESTS AND STATE INTERESTS
While not attempting to outline a comprehensive theory of judi-
cial or legislative activity with respect to matters of individual lib-
erty and family integrity, this commentary will try to suggest some
of the problems, from a libertarian perspective, generated by cur-
rent legal doctrines that are generally accepted as the proper articu-
lation of the state's interest in these particular fields.
A. Individual Liberty in Constitutional Terms
There are a number of ways in which a libertarian might frame
a constitutional claim to be free from majoritarian interference in
the "self-regarding" sphere. For example, the free exercise clause of
the first amendment 0 might be invoked as the basis for an asserted
right to use psychoactive drugs3' or to refuse blood transfusions,32
29. See note 9 supra. In Moose Lodge v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972), Justice Rehnquist,
in writing for the majority, concluded that the equal protection clause of the 14th amendment
did not apply to the guest policies of a private club, but his differences with the dissent appear
to be based upon a different conception of the facts about liquor licenses. Cf. California v.
LaRue, 409 U.S. 109 (1972) (Rehnquist, J.) (Justice Rehnquist concluded that the state's
authority under the 21st amendment permitted it to regulate activities that were within the
limits of the 1st and 14th amendments' protection of freedom of expression). One finds no
homily to private institutions and associational rights against the state, such as that pre-
sented by Douglas' dissent in Moose Lodge, 407 U.S. at 207.
30. "Congress shall make no law . . . prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]." U.S.
CONST. amend. I.
31. Compare People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 691 (1964)
(statutory ban upon peyote unconstitutional as applied to Indian tribe, which had valid free
exercise claim), with Leary v. United States, 383 F.2d 851, 861 (5th Cir. 1967) (denying such
exemption for marijuana possession where drug not central to religious ceremony and prac-
tice), rev'd on other grounds, 395 U.S. 6 (1969).
32. See cases cited in note 248 infra.
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and the equal protection clause33 might be invoked as the basis for
a right of unmarried adults to purchase contraceptives.u In recent
years, however, constitutional attacks upon civil and criminal stat-
utes that interfere with fundamental personal decisions have
usually been framed in terms of the "right of privacy, '35 reformu-
lated by scholars as the "right of autonomy,"3 the "lifestyle right""
or the "personal question doctrine."' Justice Rehnquist, 3 among
others,'0 has criticized this approach as reintroducing discredited
substantive due process"1 under another name. Basically, the criti-
33. "[N]or [shall any state] deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protec-
tion of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
34. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
35. See, e.g., Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977); Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416
U.S. 1 (1974); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113 (1973); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494 (Alas. 1975);
People v. Sinclair, 387 Mich. 91, 194 N.W.2d 878, 896 (1972) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring);
A. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM (1967); Gerety, Redefining Privacy, 12 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 233 (1977); Greenawalt, The Right of Privacy, in THE RIGHTS oF AMmcANs (N. Doreen
ed. 1972); Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy, 74 COLUM. L. Rov. 1410 (1974); Marshall, The
Right to Privacy: A Skeptical View, 21 McGIL L.J. 242 (1975); 26 STAN. L. Rzv. 1161 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Privacy].
36. Several authors have attempted to provide a coherent analysis of the extensive body
of law surrounding the concept of "privacy" by distinguishing two primary meanings: (1)
selective disclosure or freedom from governmental intrusion, and (2) autonomy or freedom
from governmental regulation. The "selective disclosure" meaning of privacy is "the claim
of individuals, groups, and institutions to determine for themselves when, how and to what
extent information about them is communicated to others." A. WESTIN, supra note 35, at 7.
This right rests upon the 4th amendment. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Wolf v.
Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949). In general, it is only peripherally involved in the issues discussed
in this commentary. The second meaning of privacy has been designated "autonomy," which
is the right of individuals "to perform certain acts or undergo certain experiences." Privacy,
supra note 35, at 1163; see Gerety, supra note 35; Greenawalt, supra note 35, at 323 n.3;
Henkin, supra note 35.
While it is important, for analytic purposes, to separate these two meanings, it is worth
noting that the main reason people wish to avoid. disclosure is that societal judgments are
harsh. Hence, from the layman's perspective there may be a close relationship between the
selective disclosure and the autonomy sense of privacy. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589
(1977), in which the appellants claimed both types of privacy were violated by a New York
State law that required the recording and central storage of prescriptions for certain drugs
that had both legal and illegal uses.
37. Wilkinson & White, Constitutional Protection for Personal Lifestyles, 62 CoRN .L L.
REv. 563 (1977).
38. Tribe, supra note 2, at 32. This doctrine was later developed by Professor Tribe into
the "right of personhood." L. TIME, supra note 3, at §§ 15-1 to -20; see note 26 supra.
39. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 718-19 (1977) (Rbhnquist, J., dissent-
ing); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 177 (1972) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting);
Rehnquist, The Expanded Right of Privacy Consistent with Fair and Effective Law
Enforcement, 23 KAN. L. Rav. 1 (1974).
40. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 511 (1965) (Black,. J., dissenting).
41. The "old" substantive due process involved judicial attempts to defend property
rights against state-imposed economic regulations by invoking the due process clause. See,
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cism asks why the due process clause 2 does not protect property
rights against redistributional legislation43 but does protect personal
liberty against the state's enforcement of conventional morality. 4
Professor Tribe has answered that it protects both personal liberty
and economic liberty against intrusive legislation." In his de Hirsch
Meyer lecture he adds that it is only the fallacy of "institution-
alism" which leads us to believe that "excesses of judicial inter-
vention, whether in the era of. . . Lochner v. New York or in some
other period, demonstrate the unsuitability of courts as major insti-
tutions for social change,"" or somehow prove that "the court was
in the wrong business."' 7
Varying levels of judicial scrutiny have been applied to asserted
claims of state interference with individual liberty. The traditional
approach involves applying "strict scrutiny" when the interest in-
fringed upon is deemed fundamental."8 A minimal level of scrutiny,
e.g., Williams v. Standard Oil Co., 278 U.S. 235 (1929); Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S.
525 (1923); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1915);
Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897). See also G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 548-49
(9th ed. 1975).
For cases that reject economic substantive due process, see Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S.
726 (1963); West Coast Hotel v. Parish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S.
502 (1934).
An interesting question at this point is how Justice Rehnquist would rule if he were
presented with the issues in Allgeyer and Lochner today. See National League of Cities v.
Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (Rehnquist, J.) (ruling that "state sovereignty" prevented the
application of wage and hour legislation to state and municipal employees); United States
Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977) (Justice Rehnquist joining in an opinion that up-
held claims of bondholders against state mass transit statute on contract clause grounds).
42. "No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law .... " U.S. CONST. amend. V. "[Nior shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law." Id. amend. XIV, § 1.
43. See notes 65-67 and accompanying text infra.
44. See notes 68-110 and accompanying text infra.
45. What was wrong [with the Lochner line of cases] was simply that, as a
picture of freedom in industrial society, the one painted by the Justices badly
distorted the character and needs of the human condition and the reality of the
economic situation. We may believe that judges will often get such things wrong.
But so will other people, including legislators. To be sure, legislators are
elected-but they cannot avoid distance from the people much more readily than
judges can. And in any event, as long as judges are in the business of deciding
cases-even garden-variety contract and property cases-they will be shaping the
society even when they claim they are "only" deferring to others. In short, there
is no escape from the difficult task of painting a better-a morally and economi-
cally truer-picture; to leave the canvas blank from time to time just hands the
brushes over to other drtists.
L. TRIBE, supra note 3, at 455 n.37.
46. Tribe, supra note 3, at 54.
47. Id. at 56.
48. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113 (1973); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
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or the "rational relationship test," is applied when that interest is
not deemed fundamental." There is a weaker version of the latter
test which will uphold the statute whenever "any set of facts reason-
ably may be conceived to justify it."" This approach is still followed
by Justice Rehnquist.' Under "minimal scrutiny with bite," how-
ever, the Court requires that the means chosen by the regulation
under attack substantially further the statutory objective, and it
will not hypothesize conceivable state purposes against which to
test the rationality of the means.52 Although the proposal that the
Court adopt a "sliding scale" of review5 3 has not yet been accepted
by a majority, several Justices have begun to recognize the procrus-
tean effects of choosing strict scrutiny which always results in inval-
idating the legislation or minimal scrutiny which always results in
upholding it. There are indications of increasing acceptance of an
intermediate level of scrutiny."
Despite their disagreement as to the level of scrutiny to be
applied in particular cases or in a general class of cases, all of the
current Justices appear to agree that the Court can and should
examine the substantive ends of legislation as well as the means
chosen. Even Justice Rehnquist, in dissenting from the majority's
strict scrutiny of a Texas abortion statute in Roe v. Wade,"5 ac-
knowledged that the due process clause "embraces more than the
rights found in the Bill of Rights."' ' He added that if the "statute
were to prohibit an abortion even where the mother's life is in jeop-
ardy," there would be "little doubt that [it] . . . would lack a
rational relation to a valid state objective." 7 Professor Tribe's anal-
ysis of this opinion is incisive:
49. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (right to
education).
50. McGowen v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961); see Williamson v. Lee Optical Co.,
348 U.S. 483, 491 (1955).
51. Zablocki v. Redhail, 98 S. Ct. 673, 692 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Carey v.
Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 717 n.1 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Trimble v.
Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 777, 784-86 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Salyer Land Co. v.
Tulare Water Dist., 410 U.S. 719, 730 (1973) (Rehnquist, J.).
52. See McGinnis v. Roisiter, 410 U.S. 263, 270 (1973); G. GUNTHER, supra note 41, at
661-63.
53. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 70 (1973) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting); Gunther, Foreward-In Search of Evolving Doctrin on a Changing Court: A
Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1972).
54. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 98 S. Ct. 673, 686 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring) (right
to marry); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (right of family autonomy);
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197-99 (1976) (discrimination on the basis of gender).
55. 410 U.S. 113, 171 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
56. Id. at 173.
57. Id. at 173.
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Concede this, and it's all over: judicial authority to reject a legis-
lature's accommodation of conflicting values is no less substan-
tive because its exercise is justified by "extreme" cases, or be-
cause it is invoked in the name of rationality. A judicial order
that a mother's life is to be valued above that of a not-yet-viable
fetus represents as much an imposition of a hierarchy of values
upon the majority as does a judicial order that a mother's liberty
is to be valued above that of a not-yet-viable fetus."
With this in mind, we venture forth into an examination of three
classes of state power generally relied upon to justify interference
with individual and family liberty.
B. State Powers
In order to achieve the analytic clarity that is often lost in both
legislation and judicial opinions dealing with individual and family
interests, it is necessary to distinguish three forms of state power.
Police power is based largely upon third-party harms, though it
tends to shade into regulation of morality involving third-party ef-
fects which are quite minimal. Parens patriae involves protection of
persons who are deemed incapable of protecting themselves from
either physical and socially mandated harms. Legal paternalism,
the third form of state power, extends parens patriae notions to
regulation of the behavior of competent adults, "for their own
good." Although limitations of time and space prevent a full-scale
critique, this commentary will test various exercises of each of these
state powers (whether by the executive, the legislature or the judici-
ary) against the third-party harms analysis discussed above. This
analysis makes it clear that police power regulations have gone too
far by enforcing conventional morality, state actions premised upon
parens patriae may be more restrictive than necessary to achieve
their stated purpose, and legal paternalism, despite numerous at-
tempts to establish it, has no libertarian roots.
C. Police Power
The vast majority of regulations that restrict personal liberty
are exercises of the police power. This power, which is inherent in
state government"' sovereignty but must be derived from more spe-
58. Tribe, supra note 3, at 55-56; see also Tribe, supra note 2, at 5 n.26.
59. This article uses the term "state" to signify any and all forms of governmental
activity-legislative, judicial and executive-at the federal, state and local levels. Where it
is necessary to distinguish state from federal governmental activity, the term "state govern-
ment" is used.
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cific enumerated constitutional grants to the federal government, °
is generally defined to include regulations to preserve and protect
the public health, safety, welfare and morals."' It includes a broad
range of governmental activities such as zoning regulations to pre-
serve community property values," traffic laws for the health and
safety of motorists," and laws against fornication aimed at preserv-
ing the moral fiber of the society. 4 We can take as our paradigm a
statute that prevents A from doing X because it would "harm" B
in some way. For example, a statute may make it a crime (or a
nuisance) for A to release noxious fumes from her factory because
they will cause physical damage to the lungs of B. This is the classic
type of third-party harms situation in which Mill found state inter-
vention appropriate.
There are some situations, however, in which police power regu-
lations take on a redistributional character. Employer A is pre-
vented from paying less than $2.50 per hour in order to benefit
employee B financially. With the growth of the mixed economy in
nearly all Western nations, the state often intervenes in private
contractual matters to redistribute opportunities or resources either
by altering bargaining strength65 or by removing certain issues from
the bargaining process altogether. This type of state intervention
was the subject of the economic substantive due process cases in the
1920's and 1930's.7
60. Usually the commerce clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, the taxing and spending
clause, id. cl. 1, the necessary and proper clause, id. cl. 18, and § 5 of the 14th amendment
are relied upon for the federal regulation of private conduct.
61. See, e.g., Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
62. See, e.g., Young v. American Mini Theaters, 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (restriction upon
location of adult theatres and bookstores); Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1971)
(restriction upon persons who could occupy one-family dwellings); Village of Euclid v. Ambler
Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (restriction upon location of commercial and residential
property).
63. For a discussion of traffic laws that go beyond third-party effects to encompass
paternalistic concerns, see note 159 and accompanying text infra.
64. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 798.03 (1977); N.Y. PENAL §§ 130.20, .38 (McKinney 1975).
For a further discussion of such morality-oriented laws, see notes 69-103 and accompanying
text infra.
65. For example, the Wagner Act, ch. 117, 46 Stat. 1084 (1931), regulates labor-
management negotiations in a way that benefits unions, and the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C.A.
§§ 1-810 (1977), contains many provisions that provide bargaining advantages for authors
over publishers. See, e.g., LABOR RELATIONS AND THE LAw 48-61 (J. Williams ed. 1965). This
type of legislation is sometimes wrongly described as being "paternalistic." See W. OBERER
& H. HANSLOWE, LABOR RELATIONS, ch. 2 (1972).
66. Minimum wage, maximum hour and child labor legislation remove certain possibili-
ties from the bargaining table. See Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 206, 207,
212 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
67. See note 41 supra.
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1. ENFORCEMENT OF MORALITY-CRIMINAL IMPLICATIONS
Police power regulations that attempt to enforce society's con-
ventional morality have received substantial attention in jurispru-
dential literature. If we forced this type of legislation into our para-
digm, it would be described as the restriction of A's sexual liberty
to protect society as a whole"8 (rather than to protect any individual
B) from a "harm" in an extremely intangible and diffuse form.
The seminal debate on govenmental regulation of consensual
sexual activities remains that between Oxford Professor H.L.A.
Hart" and Lord Patrick Devlin." Professor Hart, as a follower of
Mill, opposed governmental regulation that is directed toward the
protection of the moral fabric of society or the maintenance of be-
havioral conformity. An individual's conduct, by their libertarian
philosophy, can only be restricted when it violates "a distinct and
assignable obligation of any person or persons . . . . [w]henever,
in short, there is a definite risk of damage." 7' The third-party harms
test requires that the state, before it can restrict A's consensual
homosexual activities, prove that this conduct is likely to cause
harm to the distinct interests of one or more B's.
In contrast, Lord Devlin contended that sodomy laws are neces-
sary because "there are certain standards of behaviour or moral
principles which society requires to be observed; and the breach of
them is an offense not merely against the person who is injured but
against society as a whole."" He argued that "the true principle is
68. Adultery laws probably should not be placed in this category since they arguably
prevent harm to the "distinct and assignable" interests of the spouse and children. See note
71 and accompanying text infra. Most states have repealed their adultery laws.
69. See H.L.A. HART, LAw, LIERTY, AND MOaAUTY (1963). Professor Hart made his
initial remarks in support of the Wolfenden Committee's Report, which had proposed that
private homosexual acts between consenting adults be decriminalized. The language of the
Committee closely parallels that of Mill: "There must remain a realm of private morality and
immorality which is, in brief and crude terms, not the law's business." WOLFENDEN RE-
PORT-REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON HoMosBxuAL OFFENSES AND PROSTITUTION 61 (1957),
quoted in H.L.A. HART, supra, at 14-15.
70. Devlin, Morals and the Criminal Law, reprinted in P. DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF
MORA (1965). Devlin also invoked the ghost of James Fitzjames Stephen, Mill's nineteenth
century opponent, in an attempt to demonstrate the inadequacies of Hart's and Mill's liber-
tarian perspective. Stephen, in his righteous Victorian manner, had argued: "[Tihere are
acts of wickedness so gross and outrageous that, self-protection apart, they must be prevented
as far as possible at any cost to the offender, and punished, if they occur, with exemplary
severity." J. STEPHEN, LIBERTY, EQUALITY, FATERNITY 163 (1873)., For further discussion of
Stephen, see Wilkinson & White, supra note 37.
71. Mill, supra note 24, at 328-29. Clearly, the horror that some people may feel if they
think that their neighbors are secretly engaging in deviate sexual practices cannot count as
"a definite risk of damage." Id. See also L. TRBE, supra note 3, at §§ 15-19; Gerety, supra
note 35; Wilkinson & White, supra note 37.
72. P. DEVUN, supra note 70, at 6-7.
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that the law exists for the protection of society. It does not discharge
its function by protecting the individual from injury . . . the law
must protect also the institutions and the community of ideas, polit-
ical and moral, without which people cannot live together." 3 Care-
ful observers will note the striking similarity between Lord Devlin's
society oriented position and that taken by Justice Rehnquist in his
dissenting opinions" and his de Hirsch Meyer lecture. 5
Neither "societal education" nor "protection of the moral
fiber"-the grounds traditionally asserted by Lord Devlin and oth-
ers to justify morals legislation"-can withstand close analysis.
Many commentators" and some judges 8 believe that proscribing
73. Id. at 22. He adds that a common morality "is the mortar which binds a society
together." Id. at 9. Since he also believes "any immorality is capable of affecting society
injuriously," id. at 18, he contends that "[slociety cannot ignore the morality of the individ-
ual any more than it can his loyalty." Id. at 22. For futher discussion of the Hart-Devlin
debate, see Dworkin, Lord Devlin and the Enforcement of Morals, 75 YALE L.J. 986 (1966);
Frankel, The Moral Environment of the Law, 61 MINN. L. Rav. 921 (1977); Sartorius, supra
note 28.
74. For example, Justice Rehnquist has asserted it is "fundamental" to self-government
to be able to "legislate .in the interests of its concept of the public morality as it pertains to
minors." Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 719 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting);
see Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 171 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
75. Rehnquist, supra note 1, at 2-3.
76. One court recently concluded that "18th Century American legislatures forbade
sodomy to express moral outrage at the act itself and to prevent a general deterioration of
the moral fiber of the populace." United States v. Brewer, 363 F. Supp. 605, 607 (M.D. Pa.
1973), aff'd mem., 491 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 990 (1974). See also
Interview with Anita Bryant, PLAyBoY 73 (May 1978) [hereinafter cited as Bryant].
77. Without a great deal of finesse, the [trial court in Doe, see note 93 infra]
thus made an important and often neglected point: ascertaining and articulating
the morality of its citizens is of vital concern to the state. All legislation, after
all, is an embodiment of a collective social judgment as to what is right and wrong
or fair and just. Food and drug laws or progressive income taxes, for example,
codify certain moral decisions that people may make regarding the type of society
they want. The state's duty is primarily to implement those choices.
1977 B.Y.U. L. Rav. 170, 185; see Rostow, The Enforcement of Morals, 1960 CAMBRIDGE L.J.
174, 197-98. It is noteworthy that the justification of both authors for criminal enforcement
of conventional sexual morality is based upon an analytic confusion that results from treating
progressive income tax (clearly a form of redistribution) and food and drug laws (also a form
of redistribution though with, arguably, some physical paternalism overtones) as a form of
"morality enforcement." See also Letwin, Morality and Law, in 43 ENCOUNTER 35, 40 (Nov.
1974) (arguing for maintenance of the "pattern of civilization" through use of the criminal
law); Wilkinson & White, supra note 37, at 591-600.
78. See J. STEPHEN, supra note 70; Buchanan v. Batchelor, 308 F. Supp. 729, 732 (M.D.
Tex. 1970) (state has right to prohibit "what it considers immoral acts," such as sodomy, but
that right does not extend to marital bedroom), rev'd on other grounds sub nom., Wade v.
Buchanan, 401 U.S. 989 (1971); cf. Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 58-59 (1973)
(obscenity laws further "the interest of the public in the quality of life and the total com-
munity environment, the tone of commerce in the great city centers," and maintenance of a
"decent society"); Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 718-19 (1977) (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting).
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the "infamous crime against nature" 9 is an appropriate means of
educating citizens, especially youth, to society's indignation against
certain acts (and those who practice them). The corollary is that
repeal of the criminal sanction would be tantamount to condoning
these acts. It is submitted that this approach fundamentally misun-
derstands the proper function of criminal punishment, which is to
deter crime and (possibly) to rehabilitate the criminal.80 Indeed,
Professor Hart finds the "idea that we may punish offenders against
a moral code . . . simply as a means of venting or emphatically
expressing moral condemnation, is uncomfortably close to human
sacrifice as an expression of religious worship." 8' Moreover, the ac-
tual effect of the repeal of a criminal statute is not to grant the
formerly proscribed activity state approval but merely to permit the
activity to occur without incurring state-imposed penalties.82
The second argument in favor of laws against sodomy is that
they provide a means of preventing the moral decline of society in
general and of children in particular. 3 This proposition rests upon
two unproven assumptions: (1) that morality is a "seamless web"
such that a threat to a part is a threat to the whole, and (2) that
the removal of criminal sanctions will lead to an increase in deviant
sexual practices.8 4 With respect to sexual practices, it is extremely
unlikely that lifting the criminal sanction will increase the behavior.
Several Justices in Carey v. Population Services Internationals5 se-
verely doubted that criminal statutes actually deterred sexual
promiscuity by minors. This is probably more true with respect to
homosexual practices, which cannot be controlled easily once the
sexual preference has been established s.8 Turning more directly to
societal concerns related to the family, one theory seems to be that
79. This language is used in many contemporary statutes. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 800.01-
.02 (repealed 1974); GA. CODE ANN. § 26-2002 (1972); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:143-1 to -2 (West
1969). See also statutes cited in 1977 B.Y.U. L. REv. 170, 171 n.5.
80. See H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND REsPONSIBILITY 4-13 (1968); Allen, Legal Values
and the Rehabilitative Ideal, in L. RADZINOWICZ & M. WOLFGANG, THE CRIMINAL IN THE ARMS
OF THE LAW 65 (1971); Andenaes, The General Preventive Effects of Punishment, in id. at
74; Walker, Aims of Punishment, in id. at 48.
81. H.L.A. HART, supra note 69, at 65-66.
82. For this reason it is later suggested that even if homosexual marriage activities were
decriminalized, the approval of homosexual marriage would not necessarily follow. See note
105 infra. Nor need state-sponsored "pot" parties be the logical result of decriminalization
of marijuana use.
83. P. DEVLIN, supra note 70, at 6-7, 22. See also J. STEPHEN, supra note 70, Bryant, supra
note 76.
84. See Lister, supra note 27, at 353. The third-party harms analysis places the burden
upon the body that would attempt to rebut the presumption in favor of liberty of action.
85. 431 U.S. 678, 694-95 (1977). See also 88 HARv. L. REV. 1001, 1011 (1975).
86. See sources cited in L. TRaE, supra note 3, at 944-45 n.17.
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, decriminalization of homosexuality will lead to a breakdown of the
family by tempting heterosexuals away from their spouses for alter-
native sexual lifestyles.87 There is simply no empirical support for
this assertion in societies that have legalized and condonedss homo-
sexual behavior or in states that have simply decriminalized the
practices." Another concern is that homosexuals will molest young
children. The empirical evidence is exactly the contrary with gay
men and lesbian women being less likely to molest children than are
their heterosexual counterparts.
The Supreme Court recently bypassed an opportunity to con-
sider and evaluate these asserted individual, state and family inter-
ests with respect to criminal sodomy statutes. In Doe v. Common-
wealth's Attorney,"' the Supreme Court, over the dissents of three
Justices," summarily affirmed the denial by a three-judge district
court93 of declaratory and injunctive relief sought against the Vir-
ginia criminal sodomy statute. 4 Two male homosexuals brought a
civil rights action claiming that prosecution under the statute (or
threatened prosecution) would violate their due process, privacy
and assorted other constitutional rights. 5 The district court ruled
that the constitutional right of privacy did not extend to homosex-
ual intimacy but was confined to marriage and family intimacy.
It went on to hold that the statute was rationally related to the
state's interest in preventing "moral delinquency" and promoting
"morality and decency," 7 even though the state government had
introduced no evidence as to the interests furthered by the law.9
One group of constitutional scholars described the Court's dis-
position of Doe as "an egregious example of an unexplained sum-
87. See generally Wilkinson & White, supra note 37, at 595-96.
88. See generally note 80 and accompanying text supra.
89. E.C. BOGGAN, M. HAFT, C. LisTm, & J. Rupp, THE RIGHTS OF GAY PEOPLE 128, 138-
40 (1975) [hereinafter cited as GAY RIowrs].
90. Id.
91. 425 U.S. 901 (1976), aff'g mem., 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975).
92. Id. (Brennan, Marshall & Stevens, JJ., dissenting and noting probable jurisdiction).
93. Doe v. Commonwealth's Attn'y, 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975) (two to one
decision).
94. The same day, the Court denied the petition for certiorari of a criminal defendant
who challenged the constitutionality of the North Carolina sodomy statute. State v. Enslin,
25 N.C. App. 662, 214 S.E.2d 318, cert. denied, appeal dismissed, 288 N.C. 245, 217 S.E.2d
669 (1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 903 (1976).
95. 403 F. Supp. at 1200.
96. Id. at 1201.
97. Id. at 1202.
98. L. TUBaE, supra note 3, at 942. Judge Merhige dissented, concluding that all private,
consensual, sexual activities between adults were protected by the right of privacy under prior
Supreme Court decisions. 403 F. Supp. at 1203-05 (Merhige, J., dissenting).
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mary affirmance."" At a more general level, the Court missed the
opportunity to do what Professor Tribe's d6 Hirsch Meyer lecture
argued judicial review should do-"articulate the underlying frame-
work of rights" in the society and "provide an avenue of participa-
tion for those individuals and groups that have not yet been effec-
tively absorbed into the mainstream coalitions of pluralist poli-
tics." 0 While a summary affirmance is a ruling on the merits that
is binding upon lower courts,' it has limited precedential value for
the Supreme Court itself,02 and at least some members of the Court
believe that Doe is not the last word on the regulation of consensual
sexual conduct.' 3
2. ENFORCEMENT OF MORALITY-CIVIL IMPLICATIONS
In addition to the threat of criminal sanction for engaging in
their means of sexual expression, gays have also been subjected to
a variety of civil disabilities. 14 The most serious, in terms of family
99. P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO, & H. WECHSLER, HART & WECHSLER's THE FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 112 n.1 (2d ed. Supp. 1977) [hereinafter cited as HART &
WECHSLER]; see Wilkinson & White, supra note 37, at 591-600.
100. Tribe, supra note 3, at 45-46.
101. Lower courts have not read the case as upholding the application of sodomy statutes
to heterosexuals. See State v. Pilcher, 242 N.W.2d 348, 360 (Iowa 1976) (dissent); cf. Louisi
v. Slayton, 539 F.2d 349, 351 (4th Cir. 1976) (habeas corpus petition of husband and wife
serving prison terms for violation of a Virginia sodomy statute rejected on grounds that
constitutional right to privacy dissolved on admittance of third party to view sexual acts).
102. See Fusari v. Skinberg, 419 U.S. 379, 390-92 (1975) (Burger, C.J., concurring);
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 671 (1974); HART & WECHSLER, supra note 99, at 277.
103. Justice Brennan's opinion in Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977),
stated: "We observe that the Court has not definitely answered the difficult question whether
and to what extent the Constitution prohibits state statutes regulating [private consensual
sexual behavior] among adults." Id. at 688 n.5, 694 n.17. This language appears both in a
portion of the opinion, 431 U.S. at 694 n.17, that was joined by Justices Stewart, Marshall,
and Blackmun, and in a portion that was adopted as the opinion of the Court, 431 U.S. at
688 n.5, and joined by the above Justices plus Justice Stevens, 431 U.S. at 691 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in judgment) and Justice White, 431 U.S. at 702 (White,
J., concurring in part and concurring in result in part). The statement drew no response from
Justice Powell, who joined in another part of the opinion and concurred in result, 431 U.S.
at 703 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment), or Chief Justice Burger,
who dissented without an opinion. Justice Rehnquist, however, took violent exception:
"While we have not ruled on every conceivable regulation affecting such conduct the facial
constitutional validity of criminal statutes prohibiting certain consensual acts has been
'definitely' established. Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 425 U.S. 901 (1976). See Hicks v.
Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 343-44 (1975)." 431 U.S. at 718 n.2 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
104. These disabilities usually involve restrictions imposed by administrative officials
making security clearance, immigration, custody and bar admission decisions on the basis of
a "fitness" standard. Though no arrests have yet occurred, the fact that the gay applicant
may at some point in the future be convicted of sodomy is often treated as a basis for a finding
of unfitness. See generally Homosexuality and the Law-An Overview, 17 N.Y.L.F. 273
(1971); 82 HARV. L. REv. 1738 (1969). Some of these unsubstantiated findings have been
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concerns, is the potential loss of custody rights over their children., 5
Any restriction of parental rights, solely on the basis of sexual orien-
tation, would seem to fly in the face of a long tradition that grants
constitutional protection against state interference with a natural
parent's rights of custody and control over his or her children.0
The insistence upon procedural due process protections for paren-
tal custody rights in Stanley v. Illinois'"7 and, more recently, in
Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Re-
form'"8 seems to require a hearing with the full panoply of pro-
cedural protections before a lesbian mother or gay father can be
deprived of his or her child. The primacy of the parental interest
would seem to require the state to satisfy a very strict standard
before intervening between parent and child. The child would only
be removed from the home if the parent's sexual orientation ren-
dered him or her so unfit as to be unable to raise the child.' Yet
successfully attacked. See, e.g., Norton v. Macy, 417 F.2d 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1969); In re Labady,
326 F. Supp. 924 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (engaging in private consensual, homosexual conduct not
a sufficient ground for denying naturalization application); In re Eimers, 358 So. 2d 7 (Fla.
1978) (homosexual orientation alone insufficient basis for denying bar admission); In re
Kimble, 33 N.Y.2d 586, 301 N.E.2d 436, 347 N.Y.S.2d 453 (1973) (same). But see Boutilier
v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 387 U.S. 118 (1967) (statute excluding aliens "af-
flicted with psychopathic personality" held properly applied to homosexual).
105. The inability to obtain a state-recognized marriage might be added to the list of
disabilities. Despite support from some commentators, see generally 82 YALE L.J. 573 (1973),
the political climate simply is not ripe for legislative recognition of homosexual marriage, see
Wilkinson & White, supra note 37, at 572, and it would be hard to argue that recognition of
such a right was part of what Professor Tribe calls our "shared values." L. TamE, supra note
3, at 941-48.
106. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972);
May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 (1953); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer
v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). See generally 12 SAN DIxEo L. REv. 799 (1975).
107. 405 U.S. 645 (1972). This irrebuttable presumption case is relied upon by Professor
Tribe in the formulation of his "structural due process" analysis. See L. TRIBE, supra note 3,
at 987 & n.14, 1094 & n.16; Tribe, Structural Due Process, 10 H.Av. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 269
(1975). He has been criticized for this heavy reliance. See Dixon, The Supreme Court and
Equality: Legislative Classifications Desegregation, And Reverse Discrimination, 62 CORNELL
L. REv. 494, 519 n.132 (1977).
108. 431 U.S. 816 (1977) (suggesting that even foster families have procedural due pro-
cess rights).
109. On this high standard for protecting the family against state intervention, see
Hafen, Children's Liberation and the New Egalitarianism: Some Reservations About A ban-
doning Youth To Their "Rights," 1976 B.Y.U. L. REV. 605 and 44 BROOKLYN L. REV. 63 (1977),
both cited favorably by Justice Rehnquist in his de Hirsch Meyer lecture. See Rehnquist,
supra note 1, at 8 n.17, 9 n.20. Indeed, Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), suggests that
parental decisionmaking should only be overruled by parens patriae restrictions, see notes
111-13 and accompanying text infra, to protect the child from physical or psychological harm
but not from social harm-in that case, loss of a high school education. (Yoder thus limited
the extent of state intervention permitted by Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944),
which seemed to allow parens patriae restrictions for social reasons.) Under a very broad
reading of Yoder, it might be argued that the sexual orientation of the parents cannot even
be considered in a fitness hearing. See notes 135-37 and accompanying text infra.
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only a few courts have responded favorably to the custody claims
of gay parents.""
D. Parens Patriae
1. TRADITIONAL PARENS PATRIAE
The origins of parens patriae have been traced to the De Praero-
gative Regis statute,"' which granted the Crown custody over the
lands and persons of "lunatics and idiots" in the thirteenth or four-
teenth century."2 Eventually, this same power was exercised for
"the best interest" of children who were without parental care in
Britain"' and in the United States." 4
Since regulations passed under the state governments"' parens
patriae power often involve the same concerns as police power regu-
lations, courts sometimes confuse the two."6 The principal differ-
ence is that parens patriae legislation allows the state to act as the
surrogate parent for one who is incapable of acting for himself or
herself, usually a child or a mentally incompetent person." 7 Thus,
it involves a much narrower and more debatable exercise of state
authority than does the general police power. In terms of our para-
digm, an example of parens patriae legislation would be a statute
110. See, e.g., Spence v. Durham, 283 N.C. 671, 198 S.E.2d 537 (1973), cert. denied sub
noma., Spence v. Spence, 415 U.S. 918 (1974); People v. Brown, 49 Mich. App. 358, 212
N.W.2d 55 (1973); A. v. A., 15 Or. App. 353, 514 P.2d 358 (1973).
111. 17 Edw. 2, c. 9-10 (1324).
112. Compare S. BRAKEL & R. ROCK, THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 2 (1971)
(citing the statute as 17 Edw. 1, c. 9 and giving its date between 1255 and 1290) with
Developments in the Law-Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 87 HARv. L. REv. 1190, 1207
n.40 (1974) (citing the statute as in note 111 supra) [hereinafter cited as Developments].
113. See Eyre v. Countess of Shaftesbury, 24 Eng. Rep. 659 (1725) (father's duty is
paramount, so custody of infant Earl of Shaftesbury given to guardian named in father's will
over mother, considered guardian only by nature and nurture); Beverley's Case, 4 Co. 123b,
76 Eng. Rep. 1118 (K.B. 1603); 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES* 426-27 (10th ed. 1787); S.
BRAKEL & R. ROCK, supra note 112 at 1-b; Hafen, supra note 109, at 617 n.34; 44 BROOKLYN
L. REv. 63, 69 (1977); 6 LINCOLN L. REv. 65, 66 (1970).
114. See 6 LINCOLN L. REv. 65, 67 (1970). See generally, Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405
U.S. 251, 257 (1972). For historical discussion of parens patriae for mental incompetents in
the United States, see In re Oakes, 8 Law Rep. 122 (Mass. 1845); S. BRAKEL & R. ROCK, supra
note 112; G. GROB, MENTAL INSTITUTIONS IN AMERICA 4 (1973); Developments, supra note 112,
at 1209.
115. Some courts have ruled that the federal government does not possess parens patriae
power, at least with respect to civil commitment. See, e.g., Pigg v. Patterson, 370 F.2d 101
(10th Cir. 1966); Wells v. Attorney Gen., 201 F.2d 556 (10th Cir. 1953); Higgins v. United
States, 205 F.2d 650 (9th Cir. 1953).
116. See, e.g., United States v. Greene, 497 F.2d 1068, 1087 n.1 (7th Cir. 1974) (Stevens,
J., dissenting), and cases cited in note 115 supra.
117. "When the state acts under its parens patriae power, it is seeking to protect a citizen
from abuse or harm which he is unable to avoid by himself." 48 U. COLO. L. REv. 235, 242
(1977). See also O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 574 n.9 (1975).
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that restricted the freedom of A (a competent adult) to contract
with B (a minor) for the sale of a car or a bottle of brandy, even if
B wanted to make the purchase because B must be protected from
A's possible exploitation. The emphasized language shows the pa-
ternalistic effects of parens patriae which are not present in ordinary
police power regulations. B's freedom of action as well as A's is
restricted for the purpose of protecting B from the excesses of his
own immature faculties." ' In short, because of B's status, his or her
freedom to purchase, contract or otherwise act is restricted due to
the presumption that certain activities, although not harmful to
sane adults, might be harmful to B.
Parens patriae power has been exercised to prevent physical,
psychological or social harms to (or to provide benefits for)"' chil-
dren of incompetents. Physical parens patriae legislation would
118. The real focus of the regulation is on B as a willing victim. This differs from police
power regulations which seek to prevent B from being injured by the noxious fumes from A's
factory against B's will. Here, in order to make paternalistic protection of B effective, A's
liberty must also be restricted. Compare Dwokin, supra note 26, at 111, with Bayles, Criminal
Paternalism in THE LIMrrs OF LAW 174, 176-77 (Pennock & Chapman eds. 1974). For-a discus-
sion that distinguishes parens patriae regulation of A's conduct from redistributional regula-
tion of A's conduct, see notes 1 0-55 and accompanying text infra.
119. My categorization, which depends upon the type of harm prevented, is not the only
one. Some authors have found it useful to separate parens patriae (or legal paternalism)
aimed at preventing harm from that aimed at providing benefits. Bayles defines positive and
negative paternalism as follows:
Positive paternalism seeks to benefit or promote the welfare of an actor, for
example, by requiring people to purchase retirement annuities through Social
Security or to have blood transfusions. The point is that a person be better off
after performing or omitting an action than he was before. Negative paternalism
seeks to prevent injury to actors, for example, to prevent their committing suicide
or becoming drug addicts. The purpose is not to increase the actor's well-being,
but to prevent its diminution.
Bayles, supra note 118, at 176. His further distinction between strong and weak versions of
paternalism is discussed in note 173 and the accompanying text infra. In general, physical
and psychological parens patriae can be said to prevent self-injury, thus overlapping Bayles'
negative paternalism category, but this is not always the case. For example, a law that
required everyone to perform physical exercises every day or to obtain a certain amount of
sleep every night would be a type of physical paternalism directed at benefit (Bayles' positive
paternalism) rather than prevention of injury. Likewise, social parens patriae laws can be cast
in terms of either prevention of injury or benefit.
The major difficulty with the positive-negative distinction is that the positive paternal-
ism category ("benefit" to the coercee) tends to combine aspects of paternalism and redistri-
bution. For example, in the above quotation, Bayles gives social security payments as an
illustration of positive paternalism. I would treat them as a form of redistribution.
Feinberg also uses prevention-benefit in his categorization of liberty-limiting principles.
He defines "legal paternalism" as a principle that attempts to prevent harm to the actor and
"extreme paternalism" as one that seeks to benefit the actor. He has a category similar to
my redistribution principle, see notes 65-67 supra, which he calls the "welfare princi-
ple"-seeking to benefit others. Feinberg, Harmless Immoralities and Offensive Nuisances,
in ISSUEs IN LAw AND MORALrrY 83-84 (Care & Trelogan eds. 1973).
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include statutes that permit social workers and family courts to
intervene between parents and children in order to prevent what
they define as "neglect," irrespective of the child's actual views on
the subject,'20 and court decisions that require a child to accept
blood transfusions in order to preserve life or health, despite objec-
tions by the parent and child. 2' Laws that permit the involuntary
civil commitment of a person who is not dangerous to others, 2 2 but
may be dangerous to himself, also fall into this category.'23
Laws against sexual intercourse with young children represent
exercises of psychological parens patriae. They seek to prevent the
mental and emotional problems that might be created by premature
introduction to sexual experiences and exploitation of a child who
is nominally "willing.' ' 24 Those who believe that obscene material
is harmful to the minds of its self-chosen readers or viewers"' might
120. See, e.g., Areen, Intervention Between Parent and Child: A Reappraisal of the
State's Role in Child Neglect and Abuse Cases, 63 GEO. L.J. 887 (1975); Wald, State Interven-
tion on Behalf of "Neglected" Children: A Search for Realistic Standards, 27 STAN. L. REv.
985 (1975).
121. See notes 247-53 and accompanying text infra.
122. If he or she were dangerous to others, the commitment would be on police power
grounds, see notes 56-64 and accompanying text supra, and he or she would be entitled to
full due process protections of counsel and a hearing.
123. The modern trend is to require that both the need for treatment (or protection) and
incapacity to decide upon appropriate treatment be established through a hearing that in-
volves adequate procedural protections. See, e.g., O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 583
(1975) (Burger, C.J., concurring); United States ex rel. Stachulak v. Coughlin, 520 F.2d 931
(7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 947 (1976); Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378 (M.D.
Ala. 1974); Suzuki v. Quisenberry, 411 F. Supp. 1113 (D. Hawaii 1976); Coil v. Hyland, 411
F. Supp. 905 (D.N.J. 1976); Bartley v. Kremens, 402 F. Supp. 1039 (E.D. Pa. 1975), vacated,
431 U.S. 119 (1976); Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated and
remanded, 414 U.S. 473 (1974), on remand, 379 F. Supp. 1376 (E.D. Wis. 1974), vacated and
remanded, 421 U.S. 957 (1975), on remand, 413 F. Supp. 1318 (E.D. Wis. 1976); Zander, Civil
Commitment in Wisconsin: The Impact of Lessard v. Schmidt, 1976 Wis. L. REv. 503; 52
NOTRE DAME LAW. 136 (1976).
124. B. MITCHELL, LAW, MORALITY AND RELIGION IN A SECULAR SocIETy 57-58 (1967); cf.
Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 703 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring in part,
concurring in the judgment). The rationale for restricting the sexual activities of adolescents
is usually more social than psychological. See note 127 and accompanying text infra.
125. Because it deferred to the power of state legislatures to make "unprovable assump-
tions," Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 109 n.27 (1973), upheld obscenity
regulation on a police power basis, simply ignoring the great wealth of empirical research that
has found no causal connection between obscenity and sexual or other crimes:
In sum, empirical research designed to clarify the question has found no evidence
to date that exposure to explicit sexual materials plays a significant role in the
causation of delinquent or criminal behavior among youth or adults. The Com-
mission cannot conclude that exposure to erotic materials is a factor in the causa-
tion of sex crime or sex delinquency.
Report of the President's Commission on Obscenity and Pornography 27 (1970), quoted in
Paris Adult Theater I, at 108 n.26 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See also Henkin, Morals and
the Constitution: The Sin of Obscenity, 63 COLUM. L. REv. 391 (1963).
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argue that material that is not considered obscene for adults should
be banned for minors on a parens patriae rationale.' 6
The third type of parens patriae restricts liberty in order to
protect against (or to promote benefit of) a social type. For example,
students below a certain age may not quit school, children may not
drink alcohol and adolescents may not consent to sexual inter-
course. In all three examples, young persons are prevented by the
law from forming patterns of conduct that would cause them harm
in the future. They would be unhappy in the future because society
frowns upon ignorance, sloth, drunkenness and promiscuity. Parens
patriae regulations of the social variety are subject to severe abuse
because the "harm" to be prevented is somewhat intangible and is
socially mandated; that is, it is the direct result of social norms and
pressures. Thus, a society that is intolerant of deviance could use
parens patriae of the social variety to justify severe restrictions upon
minors.'
Similarly, the juvenile justice system was intended to limit the
legal consequences of actions that are harmful to others when the
actor is an immature person who may not comprehend the full
significance of his offense.'28 For much the same reason, many states
make it more difficult to prove that a minor is contributorily negli-
gent or assumes a particular risk than is true in the case of an adult
plaintiff.'9 Other examples of the social type of parens patriae are
compulsory education, said to promote the development of the stu-
126. See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
127. See B. MITCHELL, supra note 124, at 56-57; 7 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 393, 408-09
(1972). The following summary of testimony from a child psychiatrist illustrates how far
social parens patriae reasoning can be carried even in our own society:
For the population of children with bisexual tendencies, estimated at about 3%,
it [adolescence] is a period of decision or choice. Convinced that a known homo-
sexual teacher might serve as a model for such children, Dr. Lourie suggested that
the removal of plaintiff [a gay teacher] would result in freer choice. An awareness
that homosexuality may specifically cause mental and emotional problems in a
culture which stigmatizes it underlies this assumption, and that of most experts,
that prevention of homosexuality is a worthwhile goal.
Acanfora v. Board of Educ., 359 F. Supp. 843, 847 (D. Md. 1973), aff'd on other grounds, 491
F.2d 498 (4th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 836 (1974) (emphasis added).
The psychiatrist's use of the term "freer choice" in the second sentence seems rather
strange, since he is really arguing for a limitation of adolescent (and teacher) freedom. In the
third sentence, he attempts to justify this limitation of liberty by social parens patriae.
128. Hafen; supra note 109, at 646. It should be noted that juvenile justice statutes cover
not only the matters dealt with by police power criminal statutes for adult offenders, but also
certain special "status offenses" that apply only to juveniles. For a discussion of the changes
in the juvenile justice system wrought by the judicial acceptance of constitutional rights for
juveniles, see notes 232-43 and accompanying text infra.
129. See, e.g., King v. Lennen, 53 Cal. 2d 340, 348 P.2d 98, 1 Cal. Rptr. 665 (1959). See
generally RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, § 339 (1966).
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dent's ability to assume responsibility in the future,'30 and civil
commitment, when used to provide treatment that will allow the
mental patient to reenter society.' 3'
2. THE FAMILY AND PARENS PATRIAE
The family may play two very different roles in legislative and
judicial decisions about the exercise of parens patriae power. First,
as noted above,' 2 parens patriae power has been exercised only to
protect an individual where his natural parents or guardians cannot
protect him or her, i.e., the family has the first responsibility.'3 This
has recently been acknowledged by the Supreme Court in the con-
text of civil commitment.'34
The second type of family involvement is where a child needs
state intervention in the form of parens patriae, not to protect the
child from societal abuse, but from abuse or neglect by his or her
parents. In Wisconsin v. Yoder,'35 the Supreme Court ruled that
state intervention against parental wishes is only appropriate to
prevent a substantial threat to "the physical or mental health of the
child or to the public safety, peace, order, or welfare ... ,30 Thus,
social parens patriae is not deemed an appropriate basis for overrid-
ing parental decisionmaking. Even with respect to intervention to
prevent physical harm, many authors have suggested a very strict
definition of child abuse so as to reduce state intervention based on
"a contradictory assortment of socio-psychological theories, class
prejudices, and subjective evaluation. ' ' 37 These authors argue that
130. Some extreme libertarians would also argue that the mandatory school laws are
inappropriate exercises of parens patriae. See I. ILLICH, DE SCHOOLING SOCIETY (1971).
131. Commentators and courts have rightly criticized the so-called "new parens patriae"
espoused by the Fifth Circuit in Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507 (5th Cir. 1974), and
by various psychiatrists, which would make the availability of treatment alone a justifiable
basis for involuntary commitment. See, e.g., O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 583-84
(1975) (Burger, C.J., concurring); DuBois, Of the Parens Patriae Commitment Power and
Drug Treatment of Schizophrenia: Do the Benefits to the Patient Justify Involuntary
Treatment? 60 MINN. L. REv. 1149 (1976).
Whether there is, or should be, a right to receive treatment is beyond the scope of this
article.
132. See notes 111-14 and accompanying text supra.
133. S. BRAKEL & R. ROCK, supra note 112; G. GROB, supra note 114; 6 LINCOLN L.
REv. 65, 67 (1970). Thus, the custody power of the state is solely a derivative one. See 44
BROOKLYN L. REv. 63, 69, 75 (1977) and the sources cited therein.
134. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575 n.9 (1975).
135. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
136. Id. at 230.
137. 44 BROOKLYN L. REv. 63, 64 (1977). Compare id. with Friendly, The Courts and
Social Policy: Substance and Procedure, 33 U. MtAMI L. Rev. 21, 29-32 (1978) (Judge
Friendly's attack on improper use of sociological data by appellate courts).
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such intervention disrupts the family relationship only to place the
child in an institution that may be worse than all but the most
extreme family situations.' 31
On the other hand, some courts have held, as a corollary to the
parens patriae power, that a parent qua patient may not forego
treatment that would prevent his or her death. The clearest state-
ment of this position is the opinion of Judge J. Skelly Wright in
Application of President and Directors of Georgetown College,
Inc. : 139
The patient, 25 years old, was the mother of a seven-month-old
child. The state, as parens patriae, will not allow this most ulti-
mate of voluntary abandonments [the parent's refusal of a life-
saving blood transfusion]. The patient had a responsibility to the
community to care for the infant. Thus, the people had an inter-
est in preserving the life of the mother.""
Both Georgetown College and the cases that have followed it"' seem
to identify two distinct state interests that would be promoted if
life-saving treatment were forced upon an unwilling par-
ent-emotional and psychological benefit for the children and pre-
vention of the economic burden involved in public support of the
surviving children."'
While promotion of the emotional well-being of children is cer-
tainly a laudable goal, it is too speculative an interest to override a
competent adult's claimed fundamental right to refuse treatment.
How much more emotional support the particular parent would
provide after recovery from the unwanted operation, than could be
provided by a surviving parent or relative, is a difficult inquiry for
a judge to conduct." 3 Indeed, it is the one type of inquiry that
Justice Rehnquist"' and Professor Tribe"5 agree is inappropriate for
the courts to make."6
138. See sources cited in note 120 and accompanying text supra.
139. 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964).
140. Id. at 1008.
141. United States v. George, 239 F. Supp. 752 (D. Conn. 1965) (blood transfusion
ordered for a Jehovah's Witness who was father of four); Powell v. Columbia-Presbyterian
Med. Cntr., 49 Misc. 2d 215, 267 N.Y.S. 2d 450 (Sup. Ct. 1965) (transfusion ordered for
mother of six).
142. Cantor, A Patient's Decision to Decline Life-Saving Treatment: Bodily Integrity
Versus the Preservation of Life, 26 RuToEas L. Rav. 228, 251-54 (1973).
143. Id. at 252-54.
144. Rehnquist, supra note 1, at 8-9.
145. Tribe, supra note 3, at 49-50, 57.
146. Moreover, if the courts were to accept prevention of emotional injury as a sufficient
basis for overriding fundamental parental choices, several other decisions that affect children,
such as divorce and voluntary adoption, could also theoretically be restricted by the state.
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While the danger that surviving children will have to be sup-
ported by the state cannot be refuted simply on the basis of judicial
competence, it can be answered by a substantive libertarian argu-
ment that such a state economic interest is insufficient to override
what many view as a fundamental right to refuse treatment. "7 The
possible effect upon public revenue would be de minimis, because
it is highly unlikely that a parent would refuse life-saving (or
disability-preventing)'s treatment unless the refusal were moti-
vated by a religious or other conscientious motive. "'
3. INDIVIDUAL OPPOSITION TO PARENS PATRIAE POWER
The tension between individual constitutional rights and state
exercises of parens patriae power can be seen in two recent develop-
ments. First, many of the persons who were the supposed beneficiar-
ies of parens patriae legislation have begun to assert individual
constitutional rights, contending that the alleged "benefits" and
"protections" cause harm. Women have achieved substantial judi-
cial recognition of their individual rights in opposition to various
forms of social parens patriae legislation,' 50 but juveniles have had
more limited successes. 5' Many statutes that used gender as a fac-
147. Harm to the public fisc is also one of the asserted justifications for statutory restric-
tions on engaging in dangerous activities, such as riding a motorcycle without a helmet, and
one that has been rejected by courts and commentators, including the present author, who
take a libertarian approach to the issue. See note 159 infra. It might be argued that the
probability that surviving dependents will become public charges is much greater in a
treatment-refusal case than in a dangerous-activity case. In the latter, the motorcyclist (and
any dependents he or she might have) will require state support only if an accident does occur
and head injuries result that are so serious as to cause permanent disability or death. In a
treatment-refusal case the probability of death or permanent injury can usually be more
easily calculated in advance. The likelihood of public dependency, however, will still vary
from case to case, depending upon the ability of a surviving parent or relative or of accumu-
lated savings to provide the necessary economic support for the surviving children. See In re
Osborne, 294 A.2d 372 (D.C. 1972) (patient permitted to refuse treatment where adequate
provision had been made for surviving children).
148. The danger that economic dependency will result if a parent refuses life-saving
treatment could also apply to the case of a nonparent who refuses treatment that would
prevent permanent physical or mental disability.
149. Byrn, Compulsory Lifesaving Treatment for the Competent Adult, 44 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1, 25-26 (1975); Cantor, supra note 142, at 254. See generally In re Brooks Estate, 32 Ill.
2d 361, 205 N.E.2d 435 (1965) (patient permitted to refuse treatment where husband and
adult children consented). Brooks appears to be the trend of the law. See Byrn, supra, at 35-
36.
150. See, e.g., Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977); Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7
(1975); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522
(1975); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973). But see Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351
(1974); Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961).
151. See Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977), and cases cited in notes
232-33 supra. But see Ingraham v. Wright, 429 U.S. 975 (1977); Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S.
132 (1976).
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tor in determining legal rights, especially in the employment area,
have been defended against equal protection attacks as benign fa-
vors for women, i.e. paternalistic protections and benefits.'52 Femin-
ists now argue that the real effect of this legislation has been to
protect men's jobs and to quarter women off. That is, they view the
legislation as a form of redistribution'53 toward men and away from
women. In considering the tension between such legislation and the
rights of women, Justice Brennan has acknowledged: "[Tihere can
be no doubt that our Nation has had a long and unfortunate history
of sex discrimination. Traditionally, such discrimination was ra-
tionalized by an attitude of 'romantic paternalism' which, in practi-
cal effect, put women not on a pedestal, but in a cage.""'5 In a
similar vein, one author argues that "[t]he parens patriae power
of the state has been the primary obstacle to recognizing children
as 'persons' within the meaning of the Bill of Rights."' 5
A contrary development is the attempt by legislatures and
courts to extend the parens patriae power to cover sane adults who
make what appear to be irrational decisions that may result in
injury to their minds or bodies. Some theorists have attempted to
justify this under the rubric of "legal paternalism." Professor Hart
appears to be the first significant jurisprudential figure in the twen-
tieth century to accept legal paternalism as a legitimate liberty-
limiting principle. He shares Mill's repugnance for state restrictions
upon personal activities that cause no definite or discernible harm,
but he added during his debate with Lord Devlin, that an activity
may be restricted if it causes harm to the actor himself.
E. Legal Paternalism-State Restrictions to Protect Sane Adults
from Themselves
At the outset, it is necessary to understand the context in which
legal paternalism was introduced into the discussion by Professor
Hart. First, Lord Devlin pointed out that the criminal law has never
admitted the consent of the victim as a defense, except for certain
limited exceptions such as rape. He concluded: "There is only one
explanation . . . . [T]here are certain standards of behaviour or
152. See, e.g., Geosaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948) (sustaining a statute that provided
that a woman could not obtain a bartender's license unless she were the wife or daughter of
a male owner of lic'nsed establishment); Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (sustaining a
law that limited the number of hours women could be employed in factories or laundries, at
a time when such legislation "could not be sustained for men").
153. See notes 65-67 and accompanying text supra.
154. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973) (plurality opinion); accord, Wein-
berger v. Wisenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975). But see Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 61-62 (1961).
155. 48 COLO. L. REv. 235, 265 (1977).
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moral principles which society requires to be observed."'' 5 Professor
Hart retorted that the law has a paternalistic policy of protecting
people against themselves, and he criticized Lord Devlin for not
recognizing this fact.'57 He pointed to criminal laws against suicide,
euthanasia 5 ' and masochism as illustrations. Laws forbidding mo-
torcycle riding without a crash helmet, 5' drugs that cause psychol-
156. P. DEVuN, supra note 70, at 6-7.
157. H.L.A. HART, supra note 69, at 30-31. He adds: "[The wane of laissez faire since
Mill's day is one of the commonplaces of social history, and instances of paternalism now
abound in our law, criminal and civil." Id. at 32.
158. For a detailed discussion of euthanasia and suicide, see notes 244-46 and accompa-
nying text infra.
159. Motorcycle helmet laws have generated a substantial amount of litigation. Several
courts have upheld the statutes as valid exercises of the police power. They perceived, despite
the lack of evidence, a danger to public safety if a motorcyclist failed to wear a helmet. See,
e.g., Kingery v. Chapple, 504 P.2d 831 (Alas. 1972); State v. Also, 11 Ariz. App. 227, 229,
463 P.2d 122, 124 (1969); State v. Mele, 103 N.J. Super. 353, 247 A.2d 176 (1968); People v.
Brilmeyer, 54 Misc. 2d 466, 282 N.Y.S.2d 797 (City Ct. 1967). Other courts, recognizing the
lack of evidence of any direct effect, have nevertheless ruled that the statutes are valid
because the cost of medical treatment for an injured cyclist and/or care for surviving families
may ultimately fall upon the public. See, e.g., Love v. Bell, 171 Colo. 27, 465 P.2d 118 (1970);
State v. Lee, 51 Haw. 516, 521, 465 P.2d 573, 577 (1970); People v. Newhouse, 55 Misc. 2d
1064, 1065-66, 287 N.Y.S.2d 713, 715 (Ithaca City Ct. 1968); State v. Anderson, 3 N.C. App.
124, 127, 164 S.E.2d 48, 51 (1968), affl'd, 275 N.C. 168, 166 S.E.2d 49 (1969); cf. Ad Lim v.
Territory, 1 Wash. 156, 24 P. 588 (1890) (upholding statute outlawing opium smoking and
inhaling because of danger users would become public charges).
Surprisingly, Professor Tribe also takes this "indirect effects" argument seriously:
It is not only another's heart strings but also his pocketbook at which the self-
mutilator tugs in the post-National Health insurance world. Thus the account of
liberty generally associated with John Stuart Mill has become decreasingly useful
for the definition of constitutional constraints and obligations in the modem
state.
L. TamE, supra note 3, at 890.
Several courts have, however, shown that this argument, carried to its logical extreme,
would justify almost any legislative regulation in a complex society:
If this argument were to decide questions such as presented by this [motorcycle
helmet] case, then [a] hypothetical statute requiring people to go to bed early
to preserve their health and productivity would be valid. But such an argument
does not decide the question but merely poses one factor to be considered with
other factors.
People v. Carmichael, 53 Misc. 2d 584, 588, 279 N.Y.S.2d 272, 277 (Ct. Spec. Sess. 1967),
rev'd, 56 Misc. 2d 388, 288 N.Y.S.2d 931 (Genessee County Ct. 1968). A Michigan court made
the same point in striking down a mandatory motorcycle helmet statute: "The Attorney
General further contends that the State has an interest in the 'viability' of its citizens and
can legislate to keep them healthy and self-supporting. This logic would lead to unlimited
paternalism." American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Davis, 11 Mich. App. 351, 158 N.W. 2d 72, 75
(1968). See also People v. Fries, 42 111. 2d 446, 450, 250 N.E.2d 149, 1F1 (1969) (matter of
personal safety not sufficient ground for exercise of police power); State v. Betts, 21 Ohio
Misc. 175, 184, 252 N.E.2d 866, 872 (1969) ("Included in man's 'liberty' is the freedom to be
foolish, foolhardy or reckless as he may wish, so long as others are not endangered thereby.").
A responsible libertarian position would be to oppose mandatory helmet laws as viola-
tions of individual liberty in the "self-regarding" sphere, but to take account of the indirect
economic effects by accepting the failure to use a helmet as a valid ground both for reducing
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ogical harm to their users'60 and abortions outside a hospital",' might
be added. Lord Devlin aptly rebutted: "What, alas, I did not fore-
see was that some of the crew who sail under Mill's flag of liberty
would mutiny and run paternalism up the mast."'' 2 Professor Hart
himself admitted that "Mill no doubt might have protested against
a paternalistic policy . . . nearly as much as he protested against
laws used . . . to enforce positive morality."'63 Lord Devlin was a
bit stronger, arguing that "[tihis tears the heart out of ...
[Mill's] doctrine.""' The main concern here, of course, is not Pro-
fessor Hart's lack of loyalty to Mill, but rather the asserted justifica-
tions for and parameters of legal paternalism.
Paternalism can be defined as "the (coercive) interference with
a person's liberty of action justified by (protective or beneficent)
reasons referring exclusively to the welfare, good, happiness, needs,
interest or values of the person being coerced."'6 5 Professor Hart and
other "modified libertarians" seek justifications for legal paternal-
ism that rest upon the coercee's own values rather than a societal
(or institutional) justification for limiting liberty, such as that em-
ployed by Lord Devlin in his organic view of society.' Although he
an injured plaintiff's recovery and for imposing increased insurance premiums. For further
discussion of motorcycle helmet laws, see 67 MICH. L. REv. 360 (1968); 30 OHIO ST. L.J. 355
(1969); 26 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 112 (1969); 85 YALE L.J. 826 (1976).
160. If it could be clearly proven that a particular drug consistently led to serious antiso-
cial behavior, it could be outlawed under the police power to protect others. Cf. MILL, supra
note 24, at 343 (acknowledging that drunkeness continually leading to crime can be punished
by the state). If, however, the drug caused physical degeneration of its users, physical pater-
nalism would be needed to justify prohibition. For a discussion of constitutional attacks upon
laws against possession of marijuana, see Hindes, supra note 28, at 345-52.
161. After Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) and Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973), such
restrictions can only be imposed after the first trimester of pregnancy.
162. P. DEVLIN, supra note 70, at 132.
163. H.L.A. HART, supra note 69, at 31.
164. P. DEVLIN, supra note 70, at 132. He may be correct, as can be seen by considering
Mill's oft-quoted central tenet:
[Tihe only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member
of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own
good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant. He cannot rightfully
be compelled to do or forbear because it will be better for him to do so, because
it will make him happier, because, in the opinions of others, to do so would be
wise, or even right.
Mill, supra note 24, at 263 (emphasis added). This language makes it clear that John Stuart
Mill opposed nearly all state interferences in the self-regarding area, be they moralistic or
paternalistic, though Hart may be correct that Mill did differentiate the two types of liberty
limitations. See H.L.A. HART, supra note 69, at 31-32.
165. This is the definition developed by Gerald Dworkin, supra note 26, at 108 and
modified, by the addition of the parentheticals, by Beauchamp, Paternalism and Biobehav-
ioral Control, 60 MONIST 62, 67 (1977).
166. Devlin argues that there is no conceptual difference between criminal laws based
upon physical (or legal) paternalism and the legal enforcement of conventional morality. He
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did not spell out his position fully,67 Professor Hart's justification
for preventing sane adults from harming themselves physically
seems to be a desire to preserve the individual's ability to make
future choices. Some authors find support for the notion that pater-
nalistic restrictions upon the liberty of sane adults are actually
"freedom-maximizing" in Mill's own argument against slavery
contracts 8 and by analogy to the notions beyond parens patriae
regulations of children and incompetents."9 They further contend
that the "stable preferences" of an individual are not always "iden-
contends that a moral law, i.e. a "public morality," is a necessity for any type of paternalism,
so that the society (and its lawmakers) can have a common basis for determining what is and
what is not for a citizen's "own good." P. DEVUN, supra note 70, at 136.
167. The footnotes to Law, Liberty and Morality contain some responses to Devlin's
other criticisms, but nothing new on physical paternalism. See H.L.A. HART, supra note 69.
168. See Mill, supra note 24, at 348. Professor Regan attempts to go one step further:
Now if Mill is right about this-if the principle of freedom does not require that
a man should be free to destroy his freedom completely-it seems that the princi-
ple of freedom also does not require that a man should be free to destroy his
freedom partially.
Regan, Justifications for Paternalism, in THE LiMITs op LAw 189, 193 (Pennock & Chapman
eds. 1974). He argues that this "freedom-maximizing" paternalism is a justifiable basis for
laws that forbid cigarette smoking and require the wearing of seat belts. Id. at 193-94. See
generally Dworkin, supra note 26. But see Professor Beauchamp's argument that the real
justification for forbidding slavery contracts is not paternalistic, but is the potential for third
party harms:
We do not allow [an individual] to barter himself because to do so would be to
legalize an institution virtually certain to produce unpoliceable injuries. If all men
were . . . like Kant's holy will, we might have no qualms about the institution-
alization of slavery. But all men are not . . . .Some have severely restricted
sympathies toward their fellow men; and we know that slavery at their hands
would be inherently exploitative. Nor is it likely an exploitative arrangement
could be distinguished from a free contract by some sort of voluntariness test. We
refuse to legalize slavery, then, not for paternalistic reasons, and not because
slavery agreements are in principle objectionable, but rather because we wish to
prevent the injuries some will visit on others . . . . [W]e are justified in more
than merely temporary intervention because of the need to protect non-
consenting individuals who would be harmed by the institution.
Beauchamp, supra note 165, at 74.
169. See notes 119-23 and accompanying text supra. After observing that the law treats
some persons as incapable of performing certain acts, Professor Sartorius goes on to argue:
Clearly they are not ad hoc [exceptions to the principle of freedom], but are
rather all instances of kinds of persons whose capacity to make choices which will
lead to the satisfaction of their actual needs and desires is limited or not fully
developed. In such instances, the utilitarian can justify interference in terms of
either the individual's existing needs and desires as the individual himself per-
ceives them, or else in terms of needs and desires which it can with great plausibil-
ity be argued that the individual will eventually come to recognize. Thus the
familiar, but cogent, argument for compulsory education. But if such is the princi-
ple upon which such exceptions may be based, it would appear that it would
license other forms of interference as well.
Sartorius, supra note 28, at 905.
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tical with [his or her] choice behavior, and may consistently be
argued to be out of kilter with it in specific instances." 0
Those who accept these justifications"' would favor legal re-
strictions upon an individual's choice to engage in activities that
entail a substantial likelihood of severe self-harm,' not only in
those situations in which the actor is under duress, ignorance or
legal incapacity,' but also where the individual has not adequately
170. Id.
171. Another attempted justification for legal paternalism, which purports to be faithful
to Mill's third-party harms approach, also deserves a brief discussion here. It is first presented
in Regan, supra note 168, and is further developed in 85 YALz L.J. 826 (1976) in the context
of motorcycle helmet laws. Both authors rely upon Parfit's notion that an individual is
composed of several different identities, one at each time segment. Parfit, On "The Import-
ance of Self Identity," 68 J. PHIL. 683 (1971); Parfit, Later Selves and Moral Principles in
PHILOSOPHY AND PERSONAL RELATIONS 137 (A. Montefiore ed. 1973). Thus, the choice of one
individual, for example to ride a motorcycle without a helmet, should not be binding upon
another individual, the more prudent, post-crash motorcyclist. The original cyclist can be
coerced to prevent harm to his future self-a person who is different in a relevant respect, he
is no longer the sort of person who would ignore his future well-being for the sake of a small
increment of present utility. Regan, supra note 168, at 203-05. This approach, if consistently
applied, would raise a myriad of legal and philosophical problems. For example, it would not
permit a person to make a contract for a future intervivos transfer of his property, because
his future self may not choose the same disposition. Moreover, such a fluid concept could be
used to justify extreme state restrictions upon virtually every form of conduct that has future
consequences, but it cannot provide a basis for intervention to prevent suicide (because there
would be no future self to be protected from the individual's current self-destructive act).
172. Gerald Dworkin suggests that the probability of self-harm should be balanced
against its potential magnitude, in order to determine where the state should intervene in its
paternalistic capacity. Dworkin, supra note 26. This calculus is not unknown in other parts
of the law. See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951) (limitations upon freedom of
speech); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (securities regulation).
For magnitude, the relevant questions are: (1) whether the damage is intense and (2) whether
the damage is irreversible (such as cutting off a finger). If both questions are answered in the
negative, then a greater risk may be taken by the individual before state interference becomes
necessary. With respect to the probability factor, the inquiry is: What is the likelihood that
engaging in the particular activity will lead to harm? For example, will swimming on an
unguarded beach often lead to drowning or will driving at 80 miles an hour frequently lead
to accidents? The answer to both questions depends largely upon who the swimmer or driver
is. If a skin diver is doing salvage work off a deserted beach or a driver is preparing for a future
race on the Indianapolis 500 race track, the probability of harm is less than if a novice were
engaging in the same activity. Hence, a professional-amateur distinction is a necessary part
of the probability factor, since fewer safety restrictions need to be placed upon the profes-
sional.
173. While Feinberg calls intervention in these situations a form of "weak paternalism,"
even he is prepared to admit that it would not be paternalism in any interesting sense,
because although the actor has given his consent, it is not informed consent. Feinberg, supra
note 119, at 113. In these situations, a person is taking a risk that he does not know about.
Like Mill's hypothetical of a man crossing an unsafe bridge, he does not need protection from
himself but from some outside source. He should be detained and informed of the danger and
then permitted to cross if he still so desires. The justification of this temporary intervention
is referred to by Beauchamp as "Mill's Proviso" and is distinguished from legal paternalism.
Beauchamp, supra note 165, at 67-68. See also Bayles, supra note 118, at 183. In other
situations of incomplete information, even where another person rather than a natural danger
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reflected on the results, has made "an incorrect weighing of values,"
or has pursued "transitory desires" because of "weakness of will."''
The following passage summarizes this approach nicely:
If the members of the society are nearly unanimous that certain
behavior is harmful to those who engage in it-"harm" being
judged by standards accepted by the potential actors as well as
others-and there is reason to believe that most people engage in
the behavior only because temporary psychological aberration,
extreme temptation, or a failure to consider probable conse-
quences prevents a rational assessment of their long-term self-
interest, then the state may properly try to prevent the behav-
ior.175
There are several reasons why these thoughtful attempts to
justify paternalistic restrictions upon a sane adult's liberty to make
"irrational decisions" should be rejected. First, it is rare in a plural-
ist society for people to be "nearly unanimous that certain behavior
is harmful." Moreover, in a pluralistic society, it is nearly always
problematic to determine an individual's "stable preferences."
Thus, many persons who are restricted by paternalistic legislation
"may not be choosing irrationally. They may simply have different
values . . . That is, fully rational persons with these different
values would not think the consequences of the actions injurious or
consent to the restrictions.""' This argument is illustrated by the
Jehovah's Witness who would rather die than accept a blood trans-
fusion. 17 Also, other rational adults have value systems that accord
great weight to engaging in high-risk activities, such as mountain
climbing or white water canoeing. 7  Those with counter-cultural
beliefs might also be making a rational decision, in terms of their
value system, when they discount the risk of potential psychological
harm caused by hallucinogenic drugs.'7 ' Thus, "voluntary actions of
is involved, Mill's proviso will again be appropriate. Thus, Gerald Dworkin points out that
the truth in advertising legislation is not paternalistic at all, since the only consumer liberty
being infringed is the "liberty" to apply for a loan without knowing the true rate of interest.
Dworkin, supra note 26, at 110.
If the actor is a child or other person who generally lacks capacity to make decisions,
state intervention would be on the basis of parens patriae, not legal paternalism.
174. The quoted phrases are taken from H.L.A. HART, supra note 69, at 33.
175. Greenawalt, Criminal Law and Population Control, 24 VAND. L. REv. 465, 470 n.21
(1971).
176. Bayles, supra note 118, at 181.
177. See notes 139-42 and accompanying text supra.
178. Regan acknowledges that "[sluch people ought not necessarily to be restrained."
Regan, supra note 168, at 200. He contends that the cigarette smoker has a much weaker
claim, since one cannot build a lifestyle around smoking tobacco. The author suspects that
many smokers, in the Humphrey Bogart or James Dean tradition, would disagree.
179. See note 31 supra.
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rational, strong-willed people with uncommon values would be pro-
hibited in order to compel people with ordinary values to do what
they would do voluntarily if they were not weak-willed or irra-
tional."'' 0 More generally, one author concludes that "paternalistic
principles are too broad and hence justify too much."''" Particularly
in total institutions, paternalism
gives prison wardens, psychosurgeons, and state officials a good
reason for coercively using most any means in order to achieve
ends they believe in the subject's best interest. It is demonstrable
that allowing this latitude of judgment is dangerous and acutely
uncontrollable. This is as true of Feinberg, Hart, and Dworkin's
hard core cases in favor of paternalism as is it elsewhere.18
This same risk of unlimited state intervention for the coercee's "own
good" is also great even outside such institutions.Iu
IV. STATE INTRUSIONS THAT DEFINE THE FAMILY RELATIONSHIP
With this analytic framework in mind, we turn to a series of
cases developed by the Burger Court that evaluate state police
power and parens patriae regulations that impact upon the family.
A brief examination of Justice Rehnquist's opinions in these cases
shows that he has consistently favored legislative authority over
claims of family autonomy when the two come into conflict, and
that his categorical deference to "family decisionmaking" may often
result in state-sanctioned private oppression. These cases also show
the limitations of libertarian philosophy when faced with a conflict
between two sets of individual rights: husband versus wife or child
versus parent.
At the threshold, state actions that define the membership
composition of the family institution must be considered. They are
restrictions upon marriage and divorce and upon those who will
receive essential family benefits.
While the Supreme Court has often deferred to state govern-
ment legislation in the field of domestic relations,'5 it has protected
the right of adults to enter a monogamous marital relationship
against unreasonable state barriers." 5 The principal case is Loving
180. Bayles, supra note 118, at 182.
181. Beauchamp, supra note 165, at 77.
182. Id. at 78.
183. See id.; Bayles, supra note 118; 14 U.C.L.A. L. Rv. 581 (1967).
184. Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 404 (1975); Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205 (1888).
185. The Court has, however, refused to interfere with state or federal restrictions on
bigamous and polygamous marriages. For restrictions upon bigamous marriages imposed by
state governments, see Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890). For those imposed by the federal
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v. Virginia,' holding that a state criminal anti-miscegenation law
violated both the equal protection clause, because of its racial im-
pact, and the due process clause, because "freedom to marry has
long been recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to
the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men."' 87 More recently,
Zablocki v. Redhaill5 ruled that a Wisconsin statute denying a mar-
riage license on the basis of nonpayment (or inability to assure
future payment) of previously incurred child support obligations
violated the equal protection clause. The state asserted interests
that can be characterized as social paternalism (counselling for the
parent as to his responsibility), redistributional (reducing welfare
dependency), and parens patriae (providing support for the children
who were the product of the prior marriage or liaison). In finding
these interests inadequate to justify the statute, the majority' re-
lied upon the "fundamental importance of the right to marry,","
and the concurring opinions emphasized the effect of the statute
upon indigents. 9' It is noteworthy that Justice Rehnquist was the
sole dissenter in the case, concluding that the statute was a
"permissible exercise of the state's power to regulate family life and
to assure the support of minor children."'9 2 The opinion began:
I substantially agree with my Brother POWELL's reasons for
rejecting the Court's conclusion that marriage is the sort of
"fundamental right" which must invariably trigger the strictest
judicial scrutiny. I disagree with his imposition of an
"intermediate" standard of review ...[and] with my Brother
STEWART's conclusion that the statute is invalid for its failure
to exempt those persons who "simply cannot afford to meet the
statute's financial requirements." . . . I think that under the
government, see Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14 (1946); Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U.S.
15 (1885); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878). Such restrictions are likely to
remain. See Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 68 n.15 (1973); H.L.A. HART, supra
note 69, at 38-47; L. TRIBE, supra note 3, at 946 n.19A. Restrictions upon homosexual mar-
riage, see, e.g., Baker v. Nelson, 291 Minn. 310, 191 N.W.2d 185 (1971), are also. likely to
remain for the foreseeable future even should private homosexual conduct be decriminalized.
See note 105 supra.
186. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
187. Id. at 12.
188. 98 S. Ct. 673 (1978).
189. Only four justices joined directly in the opinion, but Justice Burger's concurring
opinion reflected no qualification of any of the plurality's analysis.
190. 98 S. Ct. at 679-81.
191. Justices Stewart, Powell and Stevens relied upon these effects, and avoided the use
of a strict scrutiny test for evaluating restrictions upon marriage. 98 S. Ct. at 683-86, 686-90,
690-94. See also Califano v. Jobst, 98 S. Ct. 95 (1977) (unanimously upholding a classification
based upon marital status in the social security field).
192. 98 S. Ct. 673, 692 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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Equal Protection Clause the statute need pass only the "rational
basis test," . . and that under the Due Process Clause it need
only be shown that it bears a rational relation to a constitution-
ally permissible objective." 3
In the area of divorce, the Court has generally deferred to the
wide range of state systems, some allowing only marital misconduct
as a ground and others making provisions for consensual dissolution.
It has, however, ruled that divorce court filing fees deprived indi-
gents of the right to equal protection by denying them the only
effective means of resolving the dispute at hand."' On the other
hand, the Court, per Justice Rehnquist, upheld a one-year residency
requirement for Iowa divorce actions, emphasizing that its effect
was not "total deprivation. . . but only delay.1'1 5
In a number of cases involving illegitimate children, the Su-
preme Court has ruled that states will violate various constitutional
rights of both parents and children if they unreasonably define "the
family" so as to exclude biological progenitors or descendants where
no marriage has taken place.' Justice Rehnquist vigorously resisted
193. Id. at 692. It is noteworthy that the woman that Redhail wanted to marry was
pregnant at the time, 98 S. Ct. at 677. Thus, the statute not only impinged directly on the
right to marry, it also contributed to the creation of a new family that would be outside the
protection of the law. If Justice Rehnquist's approach to legislative restrictions upon illegiti-
mates were to prevail, see notes 196-198 infra, this child would have no real rights against
his or her parents. Hence, it is short-sighted to call this statute a "protection of children,"
when applied to the facts of the case before the Court. 98 S. Ct. at 692.
194. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971). Later cases make it clear that strict
scrutiny would apply to court filing fees only where the states government's monopolization
of the only means of legal marriage dissolution was involved. See Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S.
656 (1973) (filing fee for appeal from welfare agency upheld); United States v. Kras, 409 U.S.
434 (1973) (bankruptcy filing fee upheld).
195. Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 410 (1975). Professor Tribe criticizes the quoted portion
of the opinion for failure to recognize that "special judicial protection [should be triggered]
the moment any penalty, even one conceded as not very severe, is occasioned by exercise of
a right." L. TIBE, supra note 3, at 1004-05. The infringed right was the right to travel,
previously recognized in several Supreme Court cases. See Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa
County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); Shapiro v. Thompson,
394 U.S. 618 (1969). Professor Tribe adds: "It would indeed be an odd 'fundamental right'
whose exercise government could penalize just a bit without any special justification." L.
TRIBE, supra note 3, at 1005 n.18 (emphasis in original). Professor Shapiro is even more
critical, arguing that the conceivable state justifications developed by the majority opinion
of the "comprehensive nature" of divorce proceedings, the avoidance of "intermeddling" in
the interests of other states, prevention of "divorce mill" status and protection of decrees from
collateral attack are not sufficient to outweigh the individual interests. He concludes that
"[d]evelopment by the courts of conceivable justifications for challenged legislation has
itself been subject to criticism; requiring those who read an opinion to develop such justifica-
tions seems a serious abdication of judicial function." Shapiro, Mr. Justice Rehnquist: A
Preliminary View, 90 HARv. L. RaV. 293, 315 (1976). But see Wilkinson & White, supra note
37, at 575.
196. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (equal protection and due process violation
by denying unwed father custody without a hearing). A number of cases have held that
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the most recent extension of this principle in a case striking down a
portion of the Illinois Probate Act allowing children born out of
wedlock to inherit by intestate succession only from their mothers.,7
He violently resisted the majority's attempt to act as "a school for
legislators,""' 18 basing his dissent upon what Professor Tribe has
called the fallacy of "undue modesty.""'.
Moore v. City of East Cleveland'" might be considered an ex-
tension of the principle in these illegitimacy cases that the state
cannot unreasonably redefine the family's membership composi-
tion. Moore reviewed a zoning ordinance (passed under the city's
police power) that restricted the residents of particular households
in such a way that "a family" could not include a grandmother
living with her two grandsons who were first cousins rather than
brothers. The majority concluded that the ordinance unreasonably
interfered with family autonomy, thereby placing stress upon an
important societal institution.201 Yet, Justice Rehnquist joined in a
dissent with Justice Stewart that would have upheld this exercise
of local governmental zoning power over the claims of family privacy
and equal protection vindicated by the majority and concurring
opinions.20 2 Thus, unless Justice Rehnquist was speaking solely of
the nuclear family, his concern about family unity comes second to
his concern about furthering governmental authority. 1 3
Justice Rehnquist again indicated his preference for state police
power over family autonomy in Carey v. Population Services
International.2 He dissented rather than follow Justice Powell who
concurred on the ground that the restriction upon the sale of contra-
ceptives to minors was unconstitutional because it "unjustifiably
interfere[d] with parental interests in rearing their children. 205
Also, if family autonomy were a serious concern, one might have
expected Justice Rehnquist to join Justice Stewart's concurrence in
statutes that bar a mother from inheriting from her illegitimate child or bar the illegitimate
from inheriting from his or her parents violate equal protection. See Trimble v. Gordon, 430
U.S. 762 (1977); Glona v. American Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968); Levy v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968). But see Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971).
197. Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977).
198. Id. at 777, (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See also Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.,
406 U.S. 164, 177 (1972) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
199. Tribe, supra note 3, at 52.
200. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
201. Id. at 498-500.
202. Id. at 531 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
203. See notes 5-7 and accompanying text supra.
204. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
205. 431 U.S. at 707-08 (Powell, J., concurring). The statute made it a crime for "any
person to sell or distribute any . . . article . . . for the prevention of conception to a minor
under the age of sixteen years." 431 U.S. at 2014 n.1 (emphasis added).
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Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth,"' rather than
Justice White's partial dissent, since the former favored a parental
consultation requirement similar to that discussed in Belloti v.
Baird2°7 prior to allowing a minor to consent to an abortion.
Despite his solicitous position with respect to the family in the
de Hirsch Meyer Lecture, Justice Rehnquist's judicial opinions have
found a rational basis for legislation that restricts the right to marry
on the basis of wealth, restricts the ability to obtain a divorce,
restricts the claims of illegitimates against the estates of their par-
ents, restricts the membership of the family's home and interferes
with parental decisions about child rearing.
V. POLICE POWER REGULATION OF ADULT SEXUAL CONDUCT
A. Regulation of Deviate Sexual Practices of Married Couples
Most criminal sodomy statutes apply not only to homosexuals,
but to married, heterosexual couples as well.'"8 Prosecution of mar-
ried persons for "deviate," consensual2 " sexual practices performed
in private"' are, however, extremely rare."' Such an application of
sodomy statutes would appear to violate fundamental rights of mar-
ital privacy recognized by the Griswold v. Connecticut"' majority
opinion,13 the concurring opinion by Justice Goldberg,"' and their
206. 428 U.S. 52, 89 (1976) (Stewart, J., concurring).
207. 428 U.S. 132 (1976).
208. See cases and statutes collected in 1977 B.Y.U. L. Rav. 152.
209. See Towler v. Peyton, 303 F. Supp. 581 (W.D. Va. 1969) (Virginia sodomy statute
held constitutional as applied to husband who forced his wife to commit sodomy); cf. Cotner
v. Henry, 394 F.2d 873, 876 (7th Cir.) (habeas petitioner's guilty plea to sodomy charge filed
by wife vacated because he did not understand consent was defense required by right of
marital privacy), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 847 (1968).
210. See Lovisi v. Slayton, 539 F.2d 349 (4th Cir. 1976) (marital privacy defense to
conviction of husband and wife of consensual sodomy deemed waived by admission of out-
siders to marital intimacies); cf. Raphael v. Hogan, 305 F. Supp. 749 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (appli-
cation of sodomy statute to public acts on stage did not violate frst amendment). For an
interesting discussion of Lovisi, see Wilkinson & White, supra note 37, at 596-98.
211. Buchanan v. Batchelor, 308 F. Supp. 729, 731 (N.D. Tex. 1970), vacated and re-
manded sub nom., Buchanan v. Wade, 401 U.S. 989 (1971) ("There have been no prosecutions
• . . of married persons for private acts of sodomy" in Texas); accord, Dawson v. Vance, 329
F. Supp. 1320, 1323 (S.D. Tex. 1971). See also W. BARNzr, SzXUAL FREEDOM AND THE
CoNsTrrUrIoN 7 (1973); Project, The Consenting Adult Homosexual and the Law: An Empiri-
cal Study of Enforcement and Administration in Los Angeles County, 13 U.C.L.A. L. Rv.
643, 689, 718 (1966).
212. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
213. "We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights. . . . Marriage is a
coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of
being sacred." Id. at 486.
214. "The entire fabric of the Constitution and the purposes that clearly underlie its
specific guarantees demonstrate that the rights to marital privacy and to marry and raise a
family are of similar order and magnitude as the fundamental rights specifically protected."
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progeny."' Because of this potential application to consenting mar-
ried couples, some courts have sustained attacks upon sodomy stat-
utes that combine overbreadth, equal protection, and privacy
claims."'
B. Abortion Consent Requirements
Another form of state interference with sex-related activities of
marital partners that has recently received attention is the statutory
requirement that the consent of the husband be obtained before an
abortion can be performed on his pregnant wife." 7 It is claimed that
these laws differ from those that intervene in the marital bedroom,
such as laws against sodomy and use of contraceptives, 211 because
their purported purpose is to reinforce the marital relationship. 219
They appear to represent just the sort of subordination of individual
interests to institutional authority that Justice Rehnquist advo-
cated; that is, that the individual interest of the pregnant wife
should not be vindicated, because to do so would disrupt the marital
institution. 2 As the majority in Planned Parenthood of Central
Missouri v. Danforth221 concluded in invalidating these spousal veto
requirements, 22 such veto procedures do not ensure the strength of
the marital or family institution.2 23 Indeed, placing a state-
Id. at 495 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (joined by Warren, C.J. & Brennan, J.). See also Poe v.
Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 553 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
215. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 98 S. Ct. 673 (1978); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S.
371, 374 (1971) (emphasizing the "basic position of the marriage relationship in this society's
hierarchy of values"); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (marriage is "fundamental to
our very existence and survival").
216. See, e.g., State v. Pilcher, 242 N.W.2d 348 (Iowa 1976); State v. Elliot, 88 N.M.
187, 539 P.2d 207 (Ct. App. 1975), rev'd 89 N.M. 305, 551 P.2d 1352 (1976). But see State v.
Lair, 62 N.J. 388, 301 A.2d 748 (1973). See generally Annot., 58 A.L.R.3d 636 (1974).
217. See Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976); Poe v. Gerstein, 517 F.2d
787 (5th Cir. 1975), aff'd, 428 U.S. 901 (1976); Wolfe v. Schroering, 388 F. Supp. 631 (W.D.
Ky. 1974); Roe v. Rampton, 366 F. Supp. 189 (D. Utah 1973), aff'd, 535 F.2d 1219 (10th Cir.
1976); Comment, Abortion and the Husband's Consent, 13 J. FAM. L. 311 (1974); 22 N.Y.L.F.
65 (1976).
218. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
219. This was the argument made by the State of Missouri in Planned Parenthood v.
Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 73-74 (1976). See generally articles cited in note 217 supra.
220. He does say that Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1977), and Bellotti
v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132 (1977) are distinguishable from his central point, but he never explains
why. Address by Justice Rehnquist, Third Annual Baron de Hirsch Meyer Lecture Series at
12 (Feb. 2, 1978) (transcript on file at the University of Miami Law Review).
221. 428 U.S. 52 (1977).
222. In striking down spousal veto and limiting parental veto requirements, Danforth
merely explicated a "logical and anticipated corollary," 428 U.S. at 157, implicit in Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), that the abortion decision belongs to the pregnant woman in
consultation with her physician and that, within the first trimester of pregnancy, no veto
power rests in the hands of the husband or parent any more than in the hands of the state.
223. 428 U.S. at 71.
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sanctioned absolute veto in the hands of a single institutional mem-
ber will tend to weaken an institution such as the family, which is
built upon trust and mutual affection.
At the same time, it should be noted that the libertarian model,
which is useful in resolving state-parent conflicts such as that pre-
sented in Roe v. Wade,2"4 does not provide a clear answer to the role-
allocation questionm of which potential parent' should control the
decision whether or not to have a child. Since this decision is a
"zero-sum game," i.e. vindication of one potential parent's choice
necessarily involves total rejection of the other's, removing the state
sanction from the husband's veto effectively places the decision in
the hands of his pregnant wife. While the Danforth majority justi-
fied this on the ground that "it is the woman who physically bears
the child and who is more directly and immediately affected by the
pregnancy, "22 the potential father's right to procreate should also
be acknowledged. The most responsible suggestion is that the physi-
cian be required to notify the husband of the proposed abortion.22
This approach, even more than the parental consultation require-
ment discussed in Bellotti v. Baird,m encourages participation by
the husband in a difficult decision but leaves the ultimate choice
in the hands of the pregnant woman.
VI. STATE REGULATION OF MINORS
Even Mill acknowledges that children and mentally ill persons
do not have the same capacity to make choices as do sane adults.2
But this observation plus Justice Rehnquist's admonition against
judicial interference with family unity230 and Professor Tribe's advo-
cacy of unimpeded access to the adversarial system for disenfran-
224. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
225. See note 22 and accompanying text supra.
226. 428 U.S. at 71. One might also add primary responsibility for raising the child,
though this may be changing with emerging developments in shared parenthood.
227. See generally Roe v. Rampton, 394 F. Supp. 677, 681-82 (D. Utah 1975) (abstaining
in constitutional challenge to statute that embodied such a spousal notification requirement),
aff'd, 535 F.2d 1219 (10th Cir. 1976). But see 22 N.Y.L.S. L. Rxv. 65, 78 (1976) (arguing such
a requirement unduly, impinges upon the privacy of the pregnant wife). Another suggestion
is that the state legislature might make an abortion performed without the husband's consent
ground for divorce. See Poe v. Gerstein, 517 F.2d 787, 797 (5th Cir. 1975), affl'd, 428 U.S. 901
(1976). One author has even gone so far as to suggest that if no statutory ground is available
for refusal to procreate, the husband may have a federal constitutional right to a divorce if
his wife has contraceptive surgery or repeated abortions without his consent. See 23 N.Y.L.S.
L. Rxv. 99, 112, 116 (1977).
228. 428 U.S. 132 (1976).
229. Mill, supra note 24, at 263. He, therefore, had no opposition to legal restrictions
upon minors.
230. Rehnquist, supra note 1, at 9.
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chised groups = 1 offer only limited guidance for the resolution of
difficult cases involving parent-child conflicts relating to sexual ac-
tivities, medical care and civil commitment.
A. Regulation of Sexual Activities of Minors
State regulation of the behavior of minors has been extensive,
drawing upon both police and parens patriae power. There is, how-
ever, a trend toward according to children certain constitutional
rights previously held only by adults. Until recently, constitutional
rights of minors were recognized almost exclusively in cases involv-
ing two arenas-public schools =2 and juvenile courts. 3 3 Moreover,
these cases did not involve conflicts between parents and children,
but solely conflicts between the state and parents who claimed to
be asserting both their own rights and the rights of their children.
Recently, the Supreme Court has expanded the constitutional rights
of minors in the area of sexual choice in two cases that involved a
conflict between parental rights and rights of children. In Planned
Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth2 34 and Belloti v.
Baird,2 3 the Court considered the extent to which a state statute
may permit parents to interfere with their pregnant child's decision
whether to have an abortion. These cases, as well as Carey v. Popu-
lation Services International, 3 extended the constitutional rights of
minors while reaffirming the principle of Ginsburg v. New York
37
and Prince v. Massachusetts'5 that the state has greater latitude in
restricting the actions of minors than it does in restricting adults.
Justice Rehnquist acknowledges the current trend toward ex-
panding the rights of children against their parents, but he warns
of its possible destructive consequences. 39 His dissenting votes in
Danforth and Carey reflect his concern. The majority in those cases
231. Tribe, supra note 3, at 44-45.
232. See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975); Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist.,
393 U.S. 503 (1969); West Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnett, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). But see Ingraham
v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
233. See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
234. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
235. 428 U.S. 132 (1976).
236. 431 U.S. 678 (1977). Carey struck down a New York statute that forbade the sale
of all contraceptives to anyone under 16, including as well as those that were nonprescription
for adults. No direct parent-child conflict was involved in the case. In fact, the principal
infirmity found by Justice Powell in his concurring opinion was the failure of the act to permit
the distribution of nonprescription drugs by parents to their children. 431 U.S. at 707. In
short, he saw the case as being like In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), and West Va. Bd. of Educ.
v. Barnett, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), where parents wanted to extend the child's rights.
237. 390 U.S. 629, 640 (1968).
238. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
239. Rehnquist, supra note 1, at 8-14.
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held that the state could not permit an absolute parental veto of a
minor's right to decide whether to have an abortion and could not
ban the purchase of contraceptives by a teenager. They ruled that
the rights articulated in Griswold, Roe and Eisenstadt applied to a
certain extent to minors, as well as to adults.
As with the spousal consent requirement discussed above,O it
can be argued that judicial invalidation of the restrictions, thus
allowing the child to obtain contraceptives or possibly an abortion
without parental consent, actually protects the family's integrity
more than would the legislation approved by the dissenters. If an
unwanted child were born to a minor daughter because her parents
refused to consent to an abortion, the new child would stand as a
constant reminder of the fundamental disagreement within the fam-
ily throughout the entire period of pregnancy and nurturing, and
would probably be the source of continuing tension among family
members. " ' This tension could be reduced if the child were put up
for adoption. But, if the parents' intent were to put the grandchild
up for adoption, what would be the basis for their interest in forcing
their daughter to carry an unwanted child to term? Their only possi-
ble interest would be promotion of their private morality, which is
clearly not an action "for the best interest" of the child or grand-
child. Judge Friendly aptly describes the psychological and physical
harm and general distress experienced by adult mothers of un-
wanted children. 2 In addition, the young mother would suffer from
the severe pressures imposed both by her original (nonconsenting)
family and by her new, unstable one.
It is contended that allowing an absolute parental veto over
abortion would deny fundamental rights to the pregnant daugh-
ter,243 and would create discord and instability in two families. Not
only would the original family suffer from internal discord, but the
new family-composed of either an unwed mother and an unwanted
illegitimate child, or of teenagers forced into an early marriage be-
cause of their unwanted child-would be severely unstable.
240. See notes 217-23 and accompanying text supra.
241. Admittedly, an abortion obtained without the consent of the pregnant teenager's
parents might also result in family debate, but at least a new human being would not be
introduced into the scene to be the subject (and object) of criticism.
242. Friendly, supra note 137, at 32 (quoting Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973)).
243. She, too, was claiming the right of a (potential) parent to determine the destiny of
her family. This, of course, includes the right to decide not to have a family. Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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B. Choice of Medical Treatment by Children or Parents
We move now from the special case of parents blocking a child's
choice of an abortion to other forms of medical treatment for minors,
considering in particular state attempts to block treatment deci-
sions made by either the child or the parent. Even the briefest
search reveals that voluntary euthanasia " and the incipient right
to refuse treatment24 have generated substantial literature.24 Thus,
244. "Mercy killing" or "euthanasia," which means literally the "happy death," has
been described as "a term with as many definitions as proponents." Raible, The Right to
Refuse Treatment and Natural Death Legislation, 5 MEDICOLEGAL NEWS (Fall 1977). The
lowest common denominator appears to be the deliberate termination by the affirmative act
of a physician or other person of the life of a patient who is suffering from a painful or fatal
disease. See, e.g., J. FLETCHER, MORALS AND MEDICINE 172 (1955). Involuntary euthanasia is
the termination of an individual's life without his consent, while voluntary euthanasia is the
termination of an individual's life in accordance with his wishes. Foreman, The Physician's
Criminal Liability for the Practice of Euthanasia, 27 BAYLOR L. REv. 54 (1975).
The treatment of voluntary euthanasia as a form of homicide, see G. WILLIAMS, THE
SANCTIrY OF LIFE AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 318-19 (1957), is an illustration of Devlin's point that
the criminal law does not admit the consent of the victim as a defense. See note 156 and
accompanying text supra.
245. While euthanasia requires an affirmative act by someone other than the patient,
e.g., the introduction of a death-producing agent such as an injection into the patient's body,
see note 244 supra, refusal of treatment involves physician inaction at the request of the
patient, with death being the result of normal, unaided bodily processes. There is no pretense
that the line between passively withholding treatment and actively inducing death is always
easy to draw, but, like many areas of law, line-drawing is both appropriate and necessary
here. Professor Norman Cantor explains:
A patient's request to terminate further therapy should be honored, but
affirmative acts (injections, etc.) to terminate patients' lives should not be con-
doned . . . . If affirmative medical conduct to end the patient's life . . . is pro-
hibited, the patient is allowed maximum opportunity to change his mind and
demand treatment. The patient declining treatment normally remains alive for
a period and thereby receives some opportunity to articulate or demonstrate any
change of mind or to eliminate any mistake on the physician's part in compre-
hending the patient's wishes. Authorization of affirmative acts of mercy killing
would necessitate changes in state criminal law which might arguably constitute
official recognition of the "worthlessness" of some life. A physician's deference to
a patient's decision to refuse medical treatment is not currently criminal, and no
statutory changes are needed to sustain refusals of treatment. The physician who
respects the patient's choice, as required by the doctrine of informed consent, is
not concurring in the dying patient's possible evaluation of his life as "worthless,"
as might be the case if the physician voluntarily administered fatal drugs.
Cantor, supra note 142, at 228. A number of prominent medical authorities also favor the
termination of treatment at the request of a competent patient, while opposing voluntary
euthanasia. See sources cited in Byrn, supra note 149, at 28 n.129.
The termination of artificial life support systems-generally referred to as
"antidysthanasia," see S. SHINDELL, THE LAW IN MEDICAL PsCTIE 118 (1966); Hyland &
Baime, In re Quinlan: A Synthesis of Law and Medical Technology, 5 CRIM JUST. Q. 1 (1977),
when done at the request of a competent adult patient, is best classified as a form of treat-
ment refusal rather than as a form of euthanasia. See Cantor, supra note 142, at 261-62 &
n.167; Raible, supra note 244; cf. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 344 A.2d 647 (1976) (distinguished
between taking the life of another and disconnecting life-support machine, but allowed coma-
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a full scale exploration of these and related subjects will not be
possible here, but certain problem areas, as they affect the family,
will be highlighted.
The restriction of a parent's right to refuse treatment because
of the state's asserted parens patriae interest in the emotional and
financial well-being of his or her child has been criticized above. 47
Cases that employ parens patriae power to override parents' reli-
gious objections to life-saving blood transfusions for their children248
rest upon firmer ground. The state's parens patriae interest, how-
ever, is much weaker, and the parental and family rights much
stronger, when the minor's condition is not fatal. 49 More impor-
tantly, by analogy to the emerging right of adults to refuse treat-
ment,21 the child should at least be asked for an opinion on the
subject before the state steps in and requires treatment "for the
child's benefit." Moreover, Danforth seems to require greater defer-
ence to that opinion as the minor approaches the age of majority.25
The need to consult the child is more compelling when the surgery
tose patient's guardian to assert her "privacy right" to terminate treatment despite absence
of probative evidence as to adult patient's actual desires). This is because the death-
producing agent would still be natural body processes rather than an injected substance.
For the same reason, refusal of lifesaving treatment can be distinguished from suicide.
When competent adults refuse treatment (or insist upon removal of support systems) they
have not caused the fatal condition from which they suffer. Therefore, the essential elements
of suicide, active causation and specific intent to end life, are not present.
By failing to acknowledge this crucial distinction, some courts have wrongly denied
patients the right to refuse treatment. See Application of Pres. & Dirs. of Georgetown College,
Inc., 331 F.2d 1000, 1009 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964); John F. Kennedy
Mem. Hosp. v. Heston, 58 N.J. 576, 581-82, 279 A.2d 670, 672-73 (1971). See also Byrn, supra
note 149, at 16-18; Cantor, supra note 142, at 254-58.
246. See, e.g., Byrn, supra note 149; Cantor, supra note 142; Elkinton, The Dying Pa-
tient, The Doctor, and the Law, 13 VILL. L. REv. 740 (1968); Hyland & Baime, supra note
245; Kutner, Due Process of Euthanasia: The Living Will, A Proposal, 44 IND. L.J. 539 (1968);
Panel, Is There a Right to Die?, 12 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROB. 489 (1976); Sharpe & Hargest,
Lifesaving Treatment for Unwilling Patients, 36 FORDHAM L. REV. 695 (1968); Steele & Hill,
A Legislative Proposal for A Legal Right To Die, 12 CRiM. L. BULL. 104 (1976); 53 CALIF. L.
REV. 860 (1965); 65 Ky. L.J. 823 (1976-77); 60 MONIST 136 (1977); 51 N.Y.U. L. REv. 285
(1976).
247. See notes 139-49 and accompanying text supra.
248. See, e.g., Morrison v. State, 252 S.W.2d 97 (Mo. Ct. App. 1952); see also State v.
Perricone, 37 N.J. 463, 181 A.2d 751 (N.J.), cert denied, 371 U.S. 890 (1962). The rule of
Raleigh Fitken-Paul Morgan Mem. Hosp. v. Anderson, 42 N.J. 421, 201 A.2d 537 (N.J.), cert.
denied, 377 U.S. 985 (1964), which required a pregnant woman (in her 32nd week) to accept
a blood transfusion in order to protect the life of the fetus would seem to have no continuing
validity with respect to mandated transfusions during the first two trimesters of pregnancy.
See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
249. But see In re Sampson, 29 N.Y.2d 900, 278 N.E.2d 918, 328 N.Y.S.2d 686 (1972)
(operation ordered for 15 year old with disfiguring but nonfatal disease over mother's religious
objections).
250. See note 245 supra.
251. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
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involved is not necessary to save his or her life, 52 or when it is
intended to benefit someone else."3
Just as parents should not have an absolute veto over their
child's decision to have an abortion,n' they should not be able to
force her to have an abortion251 nor be able to force their children to
be sterilized. 2" Yet, Stump v. Sparkman,257 recently ruled that a
judge who ordered such an involuntary sterilization at the request
of the mother, but in the absence of specific statutory authority, was
protected by judicial immunity from a subsequent suit by the steri-
lized daughter who had been told that she would receive only an
appendectomy. Justices Stewart, Marshall and Powell dissented on
the ground that such a decision was not within the power of either
the parents or the judge, but was an administrative one that re-
quired the due process protections of notice and a hearing.'"8
The so-called "wrongful birth" cause of action is still in the
early stages of development, so it may be somewhat early to make
any serious predictions. Yet, since both Justice Rehnquist and Pro-
252. In re Green, 448 Pa. 338, 292 A.2d 387 (1972), involved a 16 year old with polio and
a resulting curvature of the spine which would cause him to become bedridden without a
spine fusion operation. Although his mother consented to this operation, she refused on
religious grounds to permit the accompanying blood transfusions, making the operation im-
possible. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania refused to order the operation over the mother's
religious objections simply "to enhance the child's physical well-being when the child's life
[was] in no immediate danger." 448 Pa. at 344-45, 292 A.2d at 390. The court remanded for
an evidentiary heating to allow the child to decide and reserved any decision as to a possible
child-parent conflict. The son's decision against surgery avoided a conflict as both the par-
ent's and the child's wishes were honored. See also In re Seiferth, 309 N.Y. 80, 127 N.E.2d
820, 148 N.Y.S.2d 45 (1955) (court deferred to negative decision of 14 year old inculcated with
father's philosophical but not religious opposition to surgery for the boy's cleft palate). But
see In re Sampson, 29 N.Y.2d 900, 278 N.E.2d 918, 328 N.Y.S.2d 686 (1972) (15 year old not
consulted before the court ordered nonessential operation for his "benefit"). For a criticism
that cases allowing children to make treatment decisions will undercut the nuclear family,
see Miller & Burt, Children's Rights on Entering Therapeutic Institutions, 134 AM. J. PsYcH.
153, 154 (1973); Wadlington, Minors and Health Care: The Age of Consent, 11 OsGoonE HALL
L. J. 115 (1973).
253. See Hart v. Brown, 29 Conn. Supp. 368, 289 A.2d 386 (Conn. 1973) (allowing kidney
transplant from seven year old, who was consulted, for benefit of her afflicted twin); Howard
v. Fulton-Dekalb Hosp. Auths. 42 L.W. 2322 (Ga. Super. Ct. 1973) (permitting kidney trans-
plant from "moderately mentally retarded" 15 year old for benefit of her mother, after
daughter's consent).
254. See notes 234-43 and accompanying text supra.
255. See, e.g., In re Smith, 16 Md. App. 209, 295 A.2d 238 (1972) (16 year old cannot be
compelled by mother to have an abortion).
256. See A.L. v. G.R.H., 325 N.E.2d 501 (Ind. 3d Dist. 1975) (mother not permitted to
have 15 year old retarded son, who was intelligent enough to understand the operation,
sterilized in the absence of statutory or common law authority or lifesaving necessity).
257. 98 S. Ct. 1099 (1978).
258. Id. at 1109. For an example of the adverse public reaction to this decision, see Falk,
The Mandarins: Judges Seek Shield from Public, Wall St. J., April 28, 1978 at 16, col. 3.
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fessor Tribe agree (albeit for different reasons)259 that a cause of
action of this type is, at the very least, unwise, some brief reflections
by this commentator seem appropriate. One way to approach the
subject is to recognize that several distinct causes of action travel
under the rubric of "wrongful life." One author uses three general
subcategories-"wrongful conception, unfortunate circumstances of
life and emotional trauma resulting from stigma."28 0
The first category includes cases like Sherlock v. Stillwater,",'
referred to by the de Hirsch Meyer lecturers. 2 ' In this type of case,
Justice Rehnquist is probably correct that the child may suffer emo-
tional trauma upon finding out that his or her birth was attributable
to a "doctor's negligence," and not his parents' desires.13 But, here
again, one should not conclude too quickly that this possible emo-
tional injury to the child is a sufficient reason to deny court access
to the parents. Would not sealing the court records, as in foster care
and juvenile proceedings, effectively prevent the child from knowing
of the proceedings?2' Moreover, to deny the cause of action on the
basis of possible emotional trauma to the child would have serious
implications for other cases brought by parents, such as right to
refuse treatment actions,6 5 paternity suits, 6' or divorce and custody
proceedings.
259. Justice Rehnquist opposes the judicial recognition of such a cause of action because
of "the effect" the lawsuit would have "upon the relationship between these parents" who
seek economic damages to cover the costs of raising the child, "from the time of his birth
through the subsequent seventeen or eighteen years which he will, in the normal course of
events, spend with his parents," "and this child," once he learns of the suit. Rehnquist, supra
note 1, at 12.
Professor Tribe discusses the issue as an illustration of his fallacy of "institutionalism."
At first, he says: "One may criticize the decision on its merits, as Justice Rehnquist has
done." Tribe, supra note 3, at 56 n.59. He goes on, however, to argue that judicial recognition
of such a cause of action is no more "foolish" than legislative recognition. He concludes:
"(The] mistake is to ask whether the courts should decide various substantive issues, when
the appropriate question is how those issues ought to be resolved." Id. at 56.
260. Kashi, The Case of The Unwanted Blessing: Wrongful Life, 31 U. MIAMI L. REv.
1409 (1977).
261. __ Minn. 2d -, 260 N.W. 2d 169 (Minn. 1977).
262. Rehnquist, supra note 1, at 10-12; Tribe, supra note 3, at 56-57.
263. Rehnquist, supra note 1, at 12.
264. Given the abbreviated statute of limitations for medical malpractice cases in most
states (California has a one year statute for all negligence actions, CAL. Cv. PROC. CODE §
340 (3) (West 1954), and New York recently lowered the period for medical malpractice to
two and a half years, N.Y. Civ. PRAc. § 214-a (McKinney 1977)), the child would not be old
enough to understand the proceedings at the time they were conducted.
265. See notes 139-49 and accompanying text supra.
266. Clearly, these suits make a public judicial record of the child's illegitimacy, but this
has not been deemed a sufficient reason to allow the father to escape his support obligations
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Once the records are sealed, the child need never know of the
parents' ordinary tort claim for (at most) the cost of caring for the
child until maturity. The arguments for placing this economic bur-
den upon the doctor or hospital rather than upon the parents are
even stronger where the action is for "unfortunate circumstances of
life. 2 7 In this type of case, the parents would want a child but not
one who was mentally or physically deformed. The parents of such
a child would sue the doctor for failing to apprise them of the danger
of birth defects, and seek to recover the costs of maintenance and
medical treatment.
In neither the "unfortunate circumstances" cases nor the
"wrongful conception" cases should the parents be able to receive
damages for the emotional trauma the birth may have caused them,
but solely for the physical pain and medical expenses in connection
with the pregnancy and possibly for the economic costs of raising
the child.2 8 When limited to such an award, neither claim devalues
the emotional aspects of family relationships215 any more than a
wrongful death recovery by a parent or spouse that includes only
loss of services and consortium and not emotional injuries.270 On the
other hand, an independent action by a child for "wrongful birth"
against his parents or the doctor probably should be rejected on the
merits, whatever its label.
271
C. Civil Commitment
The open questions in the civil commitment field involve how
much process will be due-what "kind of hearing"2 2 will suf-
fice-when a child is civilly committed. Some commentators have
taken a position similar to Justice Rehnquist that according chil-
by denying the mother a cause of action. Why then should a third party to the family
relationship-a doctor, hospital or pharmacist-be able to escape the consequences of his or
her own negligence because of the possible emotional effects upon the child?
267. Kashi, supra note 260, at 1426-30.
268. Rivera v. New York, 404 N.Y.S.2d 950 (Ct. Cl. 1978).
269. One author would even go so far as to allow emotional damages for the parents of a
deformed child, because "[rlather than berating the child's worth, such damages would
epitomize the high station he holds in his parents' hearts." Kashi, supra note 260, at 1432.
270. Assuming the parents can prove the substantive elements of their claim and the
records are sealed, the only problem with judicial recognition of these causes of action would
appear to be the terminology. Ordinary "medical malpractice" or even the subcategories of
"wrongful conception" and "unfortunate life circumstances" seem to be far superior to the
misleading umbrella term of "wrongful life," with its inaccurate (and contradictory) over-
tones that birth of a new life, in any form, is always an ultimate "good" and a "desired
blessing" for everyone. See Rivera v. New York, 404 N.Y.S. 2d 950 (Ct. Cl. 1978); Kashi, supra
note 260, at 1430.
271. Kashi, supra note 245, at 1419-26, 1431.
272. Friendly, "Some Kind of Hearing," 123 U. PA. L. Rav. 1267 (1975).
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dren the right to have a voice in treatment and commitment deci-
sions that affect them will "reinforce the likelihood of disintegration
of the nuclear family.1173 It should be clear, however, that claims of
family autonomy are much stronger when both the child and the
parents oppose commitment than in cases where the parents have
initiated proceedings which, if successful, would disrupt the family
by removing the child from home. The state will exercise its power
to commit either on a police power basis, if the child is genuinely
dangerous, or on a parens patriae basis of a psychological or social
variety." In either case, the commitment process itself with its
potential for severe, permanent intrusion into the life of the child,
triggers the necessity for the due process protections of notice and
a hearing."7 5 Since child commitment proceedings are usually initi-
ated by parents rather than by state government agencies, the di-
vergence of interests between parents and child has caused many
courts to recognize the necessity for separate counsel for the child.2
Therefore, an adequate hearing on the civil commitment of a
child should balance the child's liberty interest against both the
state interest (police power and parens patriae protections) and the
parental interest (preserving the family unit and maintaining rights
of custody and care). 77
VII. CONCLUSION
Through examination of various recent constitutional family
law cases, this commentary has attempted to suggest ways of ac-
commodating the interests of individual family members, the inter-
est of the family as an institution and the legitimate police power
and parens patriae regulations of the state. Thus the following have
been explicated: the full effects of sodomy statutes upon individual
gays as well as upon the family as an institution; the implications
of regulations in Zablocki upon the plaintiff and the pregnant
woman he wanted to marry, as well as the effects upon his original
family; and the implications of parental and spousal veto require-
273. Miller & Burt, supra note 252, at 154; see T. SZASZ, LAw LmERTY AND PSYCHIATRY
(1963).
274. See notes 119-23 and accompanying text supra.
275. See Heryford v. Parker, 396 F.2d 393 (10th Cir. 1968); J.L. v. Parham, 412 F. Supp.
112 (M.D. Ga. 1976), prob. juris. noted, 431 U.S. 936 (1977). See generally Saville v. Tread-
way, 404 F. Supp. 430 (M.D. Tenn. 1974); Horacek v. Exon, 357 F. Supp. 71 (D. Neb. 1973);
Application for the Certification of Anonymous, 42 Misc. 2d 572, 278 N.Y.S.2d 608 (1964);
Zander, supra note 123.
276. See, e.g., In re Sippy, 97 A.2d 455 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1953).
277. See Bartley v. Kremins, 402 F. Supp. 1039 (E.D. Pa. 1975); 52 NoTRE DAME LAW.
136 (1976).
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ments for the individuals, the new family and the old family. By
thus taking account of the full implications of a judicial decision,
the two extremes represented by Justice Rehnquist's and Judge
Devlin's categorical deference to legislative or parental authority
and by Mill's limited focus upon individual autonomy can be
avoided. When applied to recent constitutional family law cases,
this analysis reveals the indispensable role of the courts in defense
of family autonomy. It also shows that judicial deference to statutes
that simply give the leader of a private institution, such as the
father of a family, an unreviewable veto over fundamental decisions
by other family members will only foster institutional discord. In
short, the courts have a clear duty not to lend their sanction to
either public or private oppression that may end in the destruction
of the family.
